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ABSTRACT
In this work, I discuss the tension between the gift and market 
economies throughout the history of creativity. For millennia, the 
production of creative artifacts has lain at this intersection. From the 
time of Pindar and Simonides—and until Romanticism commenced a 
process leading to the complete commodification of creative 
artifacts—market exchange models ran parallel to gift exchange. 
From Roman amicitia to the medieval and Renaissance belief that 
scientia donum dei est, unde vendi non potest, creativity has been 
repeatedly construed as a gift. Again, at the time of the British and 
French “battle of the booksellers,” the rhetoric of the gift still 
resounded powerfully from the nebula of the past to shape the 
constitutional moment of copyright law. The return of gift exchange 
models has a credible source in the history of creativity.  
Today, after long unchallenged dominance of the market, gift 
economy is regaining momentum in the digital society. The 
anthropological and sociological studies of gift exchange, such as 
Marcel Mauss’s The Gift, served to explain the phenomenon of open 
source software and hacker communities. Later, communities of 
social trust—such as Wikipedia, YouTube, and fan-fiction 
communities—spread virally online through gift exchange models. In 
peer- and user-generated production, community recognition 
supersedes economic incentives. User-based creativity thrives on the 
idea of “playful enjoyment,” rather than economic incentives. 
Anthropologists placed societies on an economic evolutionary 
scale from gift to commodity exchange, in a continuum from the clan 
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to capitalist system of organization. I suggest that this continuum 
should now extend to the “crowd society,” which features new 
modes of social interaction in digital online communities. The 
networked, open, and mass-collaborative character of the crowd 
society enhances the proliferativeness of the gift exchange model that 
lies in what anthropologists and social scientists described as a debt-
economy.  
The exploration of the creative mechanics of online 
communities put under scrutiny the validity of utilitarian theories of 
copyright and traditional market economy models. From Émile 
Durkheim and Mauss to Alain Caillé, anti-utilitarian thought 
designed a new political economy that defines humans as a 
“cooperative species,” rather than Homo economicus. In this 
context, I look into commons theory, through the lens of Elinor 
Ostrom’s work, and its application to modern commons-based peer 
production with special emphasis on Yochai Benkler and Jerome 
Reichman’s work. In conclusion, I evoke Jean Baudrillard’s 
essential question: “Will we return, one day, beyond the market 
economy, to prodigality?” I consider whether the digital revolution 
that promoted the emergence of the networked information economy 
is that “revolution of the social organization and of social relations” 
that might bring about, according to Jean Baudrillard, “real 
affluence” through a return to “collective prodigality,” rather than 
our “productivistic societies, which [. . .] are dominated by scarcity, 
by the obsession with scarcity characteristic of the market 
economy.” I argue that a possibility for the reinstatement of 
Baudrillard’s “collective prodigality” might have materialized in the 
“crowd society” thanks to technological advancement and the 
emergence of a consumer gift system or “user patronage,” 
promoting an unrestrained, diffused, and networked discourse 
between creators and the public through digital crowd-funding.
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INTRODUCTION
The production of creative artifacts has lain for millennia at the 
intersection between the gift and market economies. According to 
the Latin brocard scientia donum dei est, unde vendi non potest,
culture, knowledge, and creativity are gifts that cannot be sold on the 
market. This idea has strong roots in ancient and medieval times. In 
earlier times, the idea intertwined with a culture of kinship and 
friendship. Later, community appurtenance and its religious 
underpinnings represented the stronghold of the construction of 
creativity as a gift. Although any categorization is problematic, 
within the multiplicity of social and cultural settings, we can roughly 
identify three economic models in the production of creative 
artifacts: gift exchange, patronage or gift seeking immediate return,1
                                                     
1. Please note that, given the scope and length of this Article, it will be 
nearly impossible to provide a proper account of the innumerable nuances emerging 
from the review of a few thousand years of history of creativity. There may be a risk 
to wrap together several things that ought to be separated and treat as a gift economy 
what is in fact not. In particular, pure gift economy and post-archaic patronage 
models should not be lumped together. See generally, on patronage, S.N.
EISENSTADT & L. RONIGER, PATRONS, CLIENTS AND FRIENDS: INTERPERSONAL 
RELATIONS AND THE STRUCTURE OF TRUST IN SOCIETY (Jack Goody & Geoffrey 
Hawthorn eds., 1984) (discussing case studies of patronage ranging from the 
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and market exchange. Throughout history, these models overlapped. 
Pure gift exchange models turned into more hierarchical forms of 
patronage, spanning from traditional decentralized aristocratic 
patronage, to centralized forms of state and royal patronage, to forms 
of participatory or planned economy. Eventually, the market took 
over almost entirely by the beginning of the nineteenth century.  
The tension between market and gift economy will hardly go 
away. Today, this tension is felt with increasing intensity due to 
recent trends of enclosure of knowledge in the digital environment. 
However, the resurgence of gift exchange models in the networked 
information economy also suggests that the notion of creativity as a 
gift may still play a determinant role. As Steven Hatcher noted,  
[w]hat is earth shattering about UGC [User-Generated Content] from this 
perspective is that because it is produced by literally millions of ordinary 
people, apparently without any expectation of economic gain, the very 
rationale for providing copyright protection to this growing body of 
creators and their works is called into question.2
Again, Mark Lemley explained: 
[C]reativity is flourishing on the Internet as never before despite the 
absence of effective IP enforcement. That is a problem for IP theory, 
which may not be the main driver of creativity in a world where creation, 
reproduction, and distribution are cheap. That is increasingly the world in 
which we will live.3
In peer- and user-generated production, community recognition 
supersedes economic incentives. The exploration of the creative 
mechanics of online communities put under scrutiny the validity of 
utilitarian theories of copyright. In general, according to an emerging 
anti-utilitarian perspective, which builds on Marcel Mauss’s gift 
studies,4 “[h]uman beings’ first desire is to be recognized and valued 
as givers.”5
In this Article, I consider whether the digital revolution that 
promoted the emergence of the networked information economy is 
                                                                                                               
Mediterranean to the Near and Far East and Latin America); PATRONAGE IN ANCIENT 
SOCIETY 1-3 (Andrew Wallace-Hadrill ed., Routledge 1990). 
2. Steven A. Hetcher, Hume’s Penguin, or, Yochai Benkler and the Nature 
of Peer Production, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 963, 965 (2009). 
3. See Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 460, 460 (2015). 
4. See MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE 
IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES (Routledge 1990) (1923). 
5. ALAIN CAILLÉ, REVUE DU MAUSS, ANTI-UTILITARIANISM, ECONOMICS 
AND THE GIFT-PARADIGM 7 (n.d.), http://www.revuedumauss.com.fr/media/ACstake.pdf. 
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that “revolution of the social organization and of social relations” 
that might bring about, according to Jean Baudrillard, “real
affluence” through a return to “collective ‘improvidence’ and 
‘prodigality,’” rather than our “productivistic societies which . . . are 
dominated by scarcity, by the obsession with scarcity characteristic 
of the market economy.”6 Therefore, taking Baudrillard to 
cyberspace, I evoke his essential question: “Will we return, one day, 
beyond the market economy, to prodigality?”7
In fact, the return of the gift has a credible source in the history 
of creativity. In the following pages, I will review the tension 
between gift economy and market economy in the history of 
creativity8 in order to make a prediction on Baudrillard’s question 
and the sustainability of modern creativity models based on 
collaboration, peer production, and gift exchange.9
I. ECONOMICS OF CREATIVITY BETWEEN MARKET AND GIFT
A. Pindar and Simonides or Poetry Between Market and Gift  
For a very long time, models of gift exchange were 
commonplace in Greek protoeconomic relationship.10 Marcel Mauss 
argued that economic relationships evolved from gift to commodity 
exchange.11 Gift exchange dominated the so-called clan society, such 
as the Greek aristocratic society, while the modern class society 
made private property and commodity the norm.12 The social 
function and role of authors evolved with social changes together 
with new forms of economic support for creativity. The heroic age of 
the Achaeans of the twelfth century B.C. saw the emergence of artists 
and poets related to the entourage of kings and nobles.13 The 
production of creative artifacts in ancient Greece generally enjoyed a 
gift economy model up to the fifth century B.C. Homer, for example, 
                                                     
6. See JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE CONSUMER SOCIETY: MYTHS AND 
STRUCTURES 66-68 (Mike Featherstone ed., Sage Publ. 1998) (1970). 
7. Id. at 68. 
8. See infra Parts I-II.
9. See infra Part III. 
10. See generally Ian Morris, Gift and Commodity in Archaic Greece, 21 
MAN 1 (1986). 
11. See MAUSS, supra note 4, at 91-93. 
12. See C.A. GREGORY, GIFTS AND COMMODITIES 17 (1982). 
13. See 1 ARNOLD HAUSER, THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF ART 52-53 (Stanley 
Godman trans., Routledge 3d ed. 1999) (1951). 
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“was never said to charge for his poems.”14 Instead, he is said to have 
given them away as a gift at least once.15 Gift exchange was framed 
along with the rules of hospitality of the heroic age. Gift exchange 
strengthened the personal bonds of ancient kinship by preserving a 
situation of everlasting and reciprocal indebtedness.16
A new authorial sensitivity towards compensation and 
remuneration emerged quickly, together with the slow demise of the 
clan society and the advent of the Greek Tyrants. Patronage of the 
arts rose to a new dimension.17 Courts became centers of creativity as 
part of a precise political design.18 The new social conditions 
changed the relationship between poet and patron. With the Tyrants’ 
patronage, a discourse about the authors’ rewards came about. The 
first mention of payment of a poet was made in reference to Pindar 
and Simonides, who—it is said—were paid by patrons for their 
poems.19 Pindar and Simonides exemplify the tension that 
characterized authorship through antiquity.20 Although the two 
authors were contemporaries, Pindar still belonged to the old 
tradition of courtly poets of the heroic age. He was unquestionably a 
professional writer; however, he wrote for the exclusive circles of his 
fellow nobles. Pindar referred to himself as ξένος, the Homeric 
guest–friend who was protected and offered gifts according to the 
rule of hospitality in the heroic age.21 Though he might have desired 
a reward, he praised himself with an amateurish flavor. Pindar have 
given the impression that he would have happily worked without 
                                                     
14. BARBARA GRAZIOSI, INVENTING HOMER: THE EARLY RECEPTION EPIC 41
(R.L. Hunter et al. eds., 2002). 
15. See id. at 41, 186-93. 
16. See Morris, supra 10, at 1-2.
17. See HAUSER, supra note 13, at 67. 
18. See id.
19. See HAUSER, supra note 13, at 67; see also Leonard Woodbury, Pindar 
and the Mercenary Muse: Isthm. 2.1-13, 99 TRANSACTIONS & PROCS. AM.
PHILOLOGICAL ASS’N. 527, 535 n.11 (1968) (noting that earlier poets were of course
rewarded or compensated for their poems, but we do not hear before Simonides of 
poets who sold their verses for a price). As per the reward of earlier poets, 
Woodbury mentions Odysseus, in the Odyssey 8.474-81, sending a piece of meat to 
the bard, Demodocus; Diogenes Laertius reporting that public performances of the 
poet Xenophanes received a treatment comparable to that of athletic victors; and 
Herodotus telling that the poet Arion made a fortune in Sicily. Id. 
20. See HAUSER, supra note 13, at 53-64.
21. See Woodbury, supra note 19, at 536-37. 
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compensation, simply for his own and his fellow nobles’ pleasure.22
In one of his victory odes, Pindar recited: 
To a poet’s mind the gift is slight, to speak
A kind word for unnumbered toils, and build 
For all to share a monument of beauty.23
Simonides, instead, embodied the emergence of a trend toward 
literary professionalism. He wrote for a definite sum of money and 
for anyone who was willing to pay him. His greediness was 
proverbial. In Peace, a play by Aristophanes, one of the characters 
says of Simonides: “[H]e would put to sea on a hurdle to gain an 
obolus.”24 However, this uncovered interest in obtaining a profit from 
creativity may have had a negative connotation, at least for a period. 
Pindar expressed his criticism in a passage of one of his odes: “[T]he 
Muse was then not yet fond of profit, and did not work for hire; nor 
were the sweet, soft-voiced songs of honey-speaking Terpsichore for 
sale, their faces silvered over.”25 Besides the probable competition 
between the two poets that may have driven Pindar’s inspiration,26
the passage expressed a more profound cultural contrast. Pindar’s 
ode criticized the commodification of poetry from a gift exchange 
between friends into an art whose products were to be sold in the 
marketplace.27
B. “Hermodoros Trades in Tracts,” Circulation of Knowledge, and 
Scribal Publishing in Ancient Greece and Rome  
In ancient Greece, and most pre-modern civilizations, 
knowledge and information seem not to have been regarded as an 
                                                     
22. Cf. id. at 537 (noting also that “[p]oet and patron, in the Pindaric world, 
are bound together by traditional ties of religion, family, and society, and the 
commercial value of their exchange of goods and services has relatively small 
importance”). 
23. PINDAR, ISTHMIAN I, in THE ODES OF PINDAR 231, 235 (Geoffrey S. 
Conway trans., 1972). 
24. ARISTOPHANES, PEACE 37 (Digireads.com Publ’g 2006) (1912).
25. PINDAR, ISTHMIAN II, in 1 GREEK MUSICAL WRITINGS 58, 58-59 
(Andrew Barker ed., 1989); see also Woodbury, supra note 19, at 528. 
26. Woodbury, supra note 19, at 529. 
27. See ANNE CARSON, ECONOMY OF THE UNLOST: READING SIMONIDES OF 
KEOS WITH PAUL CELAN 16-17 (1999) (comparing Simonides’s greed with Pindar’s 
gift exchange approach to creativity); Woodbury, supra note 19, at 535-36 (noting 
Simonides’s market approach to poetry).
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ownable commodity.28 In this respect, the example of the Sophists’ 
teaching activities may be instructive. They were perhaps the first 
group teaching in exchange for a reward, and many objected to the 
fact that they took fees for their teachings.29 In any event, even in the 
case of the Sophists, no ownership was likely attached to the subject 
of their teachings.30 Their audiences wrote a large number of manuals 
reporting their teachings, which others then copied.31 The Sophists 
did not report any objection to this practice. Conversely, they may 
have regarded these manuals as a form of publicity that expanded 
their reputation and perhaps increased the reward that they may have 
earned through their freelance teaching activities.32
Again, a well-known story related to Plato’s teachings seems to 
stress the ancient notion that knowledge was not to be treated as an 
ownable commodity. Undoubtedly, Plato taught first the subjects of 
his writings to a small circle of students. Plato’s hearers appear to 
have first brought the material before the public by circulating the 
written reports of his lectures. Hermodoros of Syracuse, a student of 
Plato, is reported to have made a trade of the sale of Plato’s lectures 
after preparing written reports of his instructor’s talks.33 It seems 
likely that Plato’s teachings were gifts to his hearers. In contrast, 
Hermodoros carried the notebooks of Plato off to Sicily and secured 
from their sales certain profits.34 Hermodoros’ conduct was highly 
                                                     
28. See CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: A CRITICAL HISTORY 46 (2006); See also Carla Hesse, The Rise of 
Intellectual Property, 700 B.C.–A.D. 2000: An Idea in the Balance, 131 DAEDALUS
26, 26-27 (2002) (noting that “[a]ncient Greeks did not think of knowledge as 
something that could be owned or sold,” and adding that “[a] tour of the . . . great 
civilizations of the pre-modern world—Chinese, Islamic, Jewish, and Christian—
reveals a striking absence of any notions of human ownership of ideas or their 
expressions”).
29. See G.B. KERFERD, THE SOPHISTIC MOVEMENT 25 (1981); see also 
David L. Blank, Socratics Versus Sophists on Payment for Teaching, 4 CLASSICAL 
ANTIQUITY 1, 2-3 (1985) (discussing the Sophistic model as opposed to the Socratic 
one). 
30. See Salathiel C. Masterson, Copyright: History and Development, 28
CAL. L. REV. 620, 621 (1940) (noting that Protagoras was the first who received pay 
for his lessons; however, “[h]is remunerative works [are] . . . an example of property 
produced from an intellectual product, but not yet of property resulting from the 
production of a work of literature”).
31. MAY & SELL, supra note 28, at 45. 
32. See id.
33. See JOHN DILLON, THE HEIRS OF PLATO: A STUDY OF THE OLD ACADEMY 
(347-274 B.C.) 197-98 (2003). 
34. See Jørgen Mejer, The Platonic Corpus in Antiquity, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE DANISH INSTITUTE AT ATHENS IV, at 30 n.15 (Jonas Eiring & Jørgen Mejer eds., 
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condemned in the ancient world. The moral contemptibility of 
Hermodoros’ activity lay in distributing Plato’s works for a material 
gain.35 The misconduct of Hermodoros earned such a widespread 
contempt to become proverbial—‘Hermodoros trades in tracts’—as 
reported also by Cicero in a famous letter to Atticus.36
For a very long period, works of literature were mainly recited 
or orally presented. Hearers, then, may have textualized the subject 
of the public presentation or declamation. Alternatively, at least in 
the beginning, the admirers of a poet or a philosopher supplied 
themselves with his work through their own handiwork, or that of 
their slaves, if educated enough, by copying the original manuscript. 
Demosthenes, for example, is reported to have transcribed the eight 
books of the History of the Peloponnesian War of Thucydides eight 
times.37 According to others, Theompopus and Xenophon cared for 
the transcription, and other admiring readers surely contributed to the 
circulation of the historical accounts of Thucydides.38 Later, slaves 
increasingly took up the work of copying, and teams of copyists 
were perhaps employed.39 By the end of the fifth century B.C.,
booksellers had a special place at the market reserved for books 
trade, as reported by the comic poets Nicophon and Eupolis.40
However, “it was . . . not until the time of Alexander the Great that 
the business of [book]making and selling” became more 
systematized and grew in importance.41 At the same time, there was a 
                                                                                                               
2004) (citing PHILODEMUS, 6 INDEX ACADEMICORUM 6-10 (110-35 B.C. circa)); see 
also 4 WILLIAM MURE, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE OF 
ANCIENT GREECE 39 (Longman et al. eds., 2d ed. 1854). 
35. See Katharina de la Durantaye, The Origins of the Protection of Literary 
Authorship in Ancient Rome, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 37, 60-62 (2007). 
36. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, CICERO’S LETTERS TO ATTICUS 533-35 (D.R. 
Shackleton Bailey trans., Penguin Books 1978) (June 30-July 1, 45 A.D.).
37. See GEO. HAVEN PUTNAM, AUTHORS AND THEIR PUBLIC IN ANCIENT 
TIMES: A SKETCH OF LITERARY CONDITIONS AND OF THE RELATIONS WITH THE PUBLIC 
OF LITERARY PRODUCERS, FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE FALL OF THE ROMAN 
EMPIRE 87 (3d ed. 1896) (1893). 
38. See id.
39. Id. at 132. 
40. WILLIAM V. HARRIS, ANCIENT LITERACY 85 n.92 (Harvard Univ. Press 
1991) (1989) (reporting that a trade in books is first mentioned by Eupolis in the 
420s or 410s, the dramatists Aristomenes and Nicophon referred to book-selling in 
400 B.C. circa, and by the 370s an inner-city trade in books had become rather 
common). Additionally, Plato’s Apology of Socrates mentions that anyone could buy 
the books of Anaxagoras for a drachma in the market. Id. 
41. PUTNAM, supra note 37, at 104. 
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corresponding decrease in prices, which had remained prohibitive up 
to that point.42
The center of Greek culture shifted to Alexandria after the 
Roman conquest of Greece. The market for books underwent a 
considerable change in Alexandria.43 King Ptolemy largely extended 
the production of copies of literary works and gathered most existing 
works from Greece and Asia Minor to Alexandria.44 Meanwhile, 
hordes of scribes moved to Alexandria, soon to become the first 
booksellers or publishers.45 The labor of copyists was later organized 
in an entrepreneurial form.46 The production of copies further 
expanded and a rudimentary publishing industry was born.47 Servi 
literati—slaves educated in Latin and Greek and trained as scribes—
became a very valuable commodity that constituted the backbone of 
the scriptoria set up by the scribal publishers.48
The Alexandrian publishing model was later exported to 
Rome.49 By the late first century A.D. the hub of literary activity was 
transferred to Rome, though Alexandria continued to play a very 
relevant role up to the middle of the third century A.D. At this time in 
Rome, Alexandria, and other literary centers of the later classical 
world, a system of compensation to authors gradually came into 
existence. Although fragmentary and inconclusive, the evidence of 
payments made to authors that can be traced in the Roman literature, 
especially in the Augustan age, are certainly more solid than the 
scattered references in the writings of the Greek authors.50 In any 
event, payments received by Roman authors from publishers were 
not attached to any exclusive right. Roman authors, in fact, appeared 
to be happy with maximum distribution.51 The reaction of Pliny the 
Younger upon discovering that his work was being sold in Lyon 
                                                     
42. See id.
43. Id. at 127-48; Masterson, supra note 30, at 621. 
44. See PUTNAM, supra note 37, at 131.  
45. Id. at 131-32.  
46. Id. at 132. 
47. Id.  
48. Id. at 181-83 (discussing in some detail use, education, and typologies 
of servi literati in Rome); see also Harold C. Streibich, The Moral Right of 
Ownership to Intellectual Property Part I—From the Beginning to the Age of 
Printing, 6 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1975). 
49. See STRABO, BOOK XIII: ASIA, in 2 THE GEOGRAPHY OF STRABO 380
(H.C. Hamilton & W. Falconer trans., 1906), http://www.strabo.ca/electronic.html. 
See generally Felix Reichmann, The Book Trade at the Time of the Roman Empire, 8 
LIBR. Q. 40 (1938). 
50. See de la Durantaye, supra note 35, at 81.
51. See id. at 109. 
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seems to confirm this point: “I did not think there were booksellers at 
Lyons, and was all the more pleased to learn from your letter that my 
works have a ready sale there. I am rejoiced that such favour as they 
have acquired in town, continues to attend them abroad.”52 From the 
excitement of Pliny, it seems plausible to think that, as a rule, authors 
were not offended by discovering about independent—and 
unauthorized—editions of their works; in fact, they may have been 
welcomed by the authors.53
Authors’ payments, however, remained attached to the fact that 
the scribal publishers may have had an interest in purchasing the 
original manuscript both because they wished to be the first to 
circulate the work and wanted the integrity of the manuscript to be 
guaranteed.54 Special editions—including autographed manuscripts 
or manuscripts adorned with a special seal of quality called 
sphragis—may have been part of the deal, as reported by Seneca in 
connection with an agreement between Cicero and the librarius
Dorus.55 The information on the terms of the business relations of the 
Roman authors with their publishers is very fragmentary. 
Additionally, these terms and conditions were unconsolidated and 
uncertain at best, for they did not rely on any legal provisions. In the 
end, the compensation enjoyed by the authors may have resembled 
more a form of patronage than any type of publishing contract. As 
one historian noted:  
Such compensation, doubtless at best but inconsiderable as it did not 
depend upon any legal right on the part of either author or publishers, must 
have varied very greatly according to the personality of the writer, the 
nature of the work, and the time and place of its production.56
In late republican and imperial Rome, the relationship between 
publishers and authors may also have resembled more of a trusted 
friendship than a professional association. Atticus, for example, the 
renowned publisher of Cicero, was a patron of literature, rather than 
a businessman.57
                                                     
52. PLINY (THE YOUNGER), BOOK IX: 11 TO GEMINUS, in THE LETTERS OF 
THE YOUNGER PLINY 297 (John Delaware Lewis trans., 1890) (61-112 A.D. circa). 
53. See de la Durantaye, supra note 35, at 77, 110. 
54. See id. at 77-78. 
55. See LUCIUS ANNAEUS SENECA, DE BENEFICIIS: BOOK VII, in 3 SENECA:
MORAL ESSAYS 454, 471 (John W. Basore trans., 1935) (56-64 A.D. circa); see also
de la Durantaye, supra note 35, at 75-76. 
56. PUTNAM, supra note 37, at xi-xii. 
57. See generally ALICE HILL BYRNE, TITUS POMPONIUS ATTICUS:
CHAPTERS OF A BIOGRAPHY (1920). 
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C. Maecenas, Immortality, and Amicitia  
The market was tangential in the life of Roman authors. They 
sought fame and reputation, rather than profit. Essentially, they 
sought immortality through their creations.58 In Roman eyes, 
creativity became an instrument to defy death and live on in the 
minds of the living. Horace’s immortal verses explained this quest 
for immortality: 
I have completed a monument more lasting than brass, and more sublime 
than the regal elevation of pyramids, which neither the wasting shower, 
the unavailing north wind, nor an innumerable succession of years, and the 
flight of seasons, shall be able to demolish. I shall not wholly die; but a 
great part of me shall escape Libitina [the goddess who presided over 
funerals]. I shall continually be renewed in the praises of posterity, as long 
as the priest shall ascend the Capitol with the silent [vestal] virgin.59
Ovid and Martial stressed the same point multiple times.60 The 
prospect of eternal glory was also a substantial stimulus for 
patronage of art.61 Patrons were seeking immortality through 
celebration and dedication in the verses of their protégés. 
However, Martial’s epigrams manifested a tension between 
market and gift, monetary reward, reputation, and immortality in 
Roman literary tradition. Martial was a very active figure as an 
author marketing his own creations. Together with the invention of 
the word plagiarism,62 we also owe to Martial the first form of book 
advertising. At the beginning of his first book of epigrams, Martial 
tells the readers to go look for one Secundus behind the Temple of 
Peace if they want to have his latest success:
You who are anxious that my books should be with you everywhere, and 
desire to have them as companions on a long journey, buy a copy of which 
the parchment leaves are compressed into a small compass. Bestow book-
cases upon large volumes; one hand will hold me. But that you may not be 
ignorant where I am to be bought, and wander in uncertainty over the 
whole town, you shall, under my guidance, be sure of obtaining me. Seek 
                                                     
58. See de la Durantaye, supra note 35, at 107-09. 
59. QUINTUS HORATIUS FLACCUS, ODE XXX, in THE WORKS OF HORACE 93 
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ed., 1982). 
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Secundus, the freedman of the learned Lucensis, behind the Temple of 
Peace and the Forum of Pallas.63
By defining his poetry as material commodities available for 
purchase or theft, Martial commodifies it as an article of the 
marketplace.64 In this respect, as Simonides earlier, Martial was a 
proto-modern author. However, Martial’s commodification of the 
book was in sharp opposition to the Augustan emphasis on poetic 
immortality, so that “[i]n Roman’s view, Martial’s materiality 
contrasts the tangible book with incorporeal song, the trendy 
notoriety of the present with the eternal glory of the future.”65 The 
two models reflected also a different system of valuation. The market 
could economically quantify the book as a material object. In 
contrast, the incorporeal Augustan song derived his value from the 
audience aesthetic approval and patronage support. In this respect, 
Martial’s authorship model contrasted patronage’s gift economy. As 
with Pindar earlier, the “Augustan poets conventionally portray these 
transactions in a discourse of amicitia and gift exchange rather than 
mercenary accounting.”66  
Roman literary life was dominated by the conception of the 
great domus open to literary friends and the figure of the rich man 
surrounded by his amici.67 As in the case of Gaius Cilnius 
Maecenas—the quintessential dominus who supported young artists 
and writers—the dominus is a host, critic, prompter, and provider. 
The relationship between the dominus and the artists is framed 
within the context of the institution of amicitia—or friendship. 
Horace described the house of Maecenas as a community of friends: 
“[T]here’s no place so free [f]rom intrigue as Maecenas’, no place so 
thoroughly honest. It just doesn’t matter to them whether someone is 
richer [o]r smarter than somebody else. Everyone gets along.”68
As a result of the camaraderie of Roman literary circles, the 
Roman discourse of amicitia made monetary reward a rare 
                                                     
63. Id. at 24.  
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occurrence for literary authors.69 Although the writing of many Latin 
poems may have been prompted by special occasions, and on direct 
or indirect call of the dominus and amicus, a modern commission of 
work was out of question.70 Modern forms of commission were to be 
excluded principally for the social stigma that the work for hire 
carried in Roman society.71 In this respect, poets differentiated 
themselves from the sculptors and the painters that worked for a 
reward and made no attempt to hide it.72 Additionally, recipients 
rarely offered a reward freely, to the utter disappointment of 
Martial.73 “Outright gifts of money [we]re unusual,” casual, and 
sporadic.74 Nevertheless, besides cash gifts, many benefits could 
have resulted to a Roman artist from the attachment to a wealthy 
friend, or to several friends. These included inheritances and 
bequests, loans at low or no interests, gifts in the form of land or a 
house, comfortable lodging in the town houses or the villas of the 
dominus, arrangements to hold sinecures and other desirable 
appointments, and even advantageous marriages.75
Roman authors appeared to trust the indirect gain that could be 
achieved through enhanced reputation more than direct profit from 
the sale of books. In the Ars Poetica, Horace mentioned that a 
famous book of his, read across the Mediterranean, brought him 
long-lasting fame, but gained money for the publisher Sosii.76 Martial 
appears to have received from the publishers some lump sum for 
each of his several works, generally a sum too small to make him 
happy.77 Martial lamented that, though extremely wide, the 
circulation of his books did not make him rich:
It is not the idle people of the city only that delight in my Muse, nor is it 
alone to listless ears that these verses are addressed, but my book is 
thumbed amid Getic frosts, near martial standards, by the stern centurion; 
                                                     
69. See id. at 86. 
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30, at 622. 
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and even Britain is said to sing my verses. Yet of what advantage is it to 
me? My purse benefits nought by my reputation. What immortal pages 
could I not have written and what wars could I not have sung to the 
Pierian trumpet, if, when the kind deities gave a second Augustus to the 
earth, they had likewise given to thee, O Rome, a second Mæcenas.78
Even Martial, the most market oriented of the Latin authors, sought a 
powerful patron to redress his misfortunes, rather than direct profits 
from the sale of his books. The most common tool to answer 
Martial’s lamentation, propel circulation of an author’s work, and 
augment the author’s material wealth was indeed dedication.79
Since the republican times, Roman authors traditionally 
dedicated their works to friends or literary models. The practice of 
dedications eventually evolved in the area of literary patronage. If 
initially, dedications were only intended to help an author find favor 
and advantage, later authors openly sought monetary gifts and 
rewards from the dedicatee. Perhaps patronage through dedication 
replaced contractual relationships between authors and scribal 
publishers in the market for books.80 Under this model, the patron to 
whom the work was dedicated saw to the circulation of the author’s 
work through either his own slaves or an arrangement with a scribal 
publisher.81 As Martial nicely put it, the better the patron, the better 
the edition of the book: 
To whom, my little book, do you wish me to dedicate you? Make haste to 
choose a patron, lest, being hurried off into a murky kitchen, you cover 
tunnies with your wet leaves, or become a wrapper for incense and pepper. 
Is it into Faustinus’ bosom that you flee? you have chosen wisely: you 
may now make your way perfumed with oil of cedar, and, decorated with 
ornaments at both ends, luxuriate in all the glory of painted bosses; 
delicate purple may cover you, and your title proudly blaze in scarlet. 
With him for your patron, fear not even Probus.82
Moreover, the connection with the household of a dominus was 
an extraordinary opportunity to promote an author’s work.83 The 
great houses of Rome were busy places all year. In the large salons 
of the Roman domus and villas, visitors gathered for errands and 
celebrations. The reputation of a young artist could be made or 
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destroyed in few meetings. The protection of a powerful man and his 
circle of amici against the bad publicity of jealous or malignant 
critics was a priceless benefit, as Martial points out once again: 
If thou wishest to be approved by Attic ears, I exhort and advise thee, 
my little book, to please the learned Apollinaris. No one is more acute 
than he, or more learned, nor is any one more candid or more indulgent. If 
he shall receive thee to his heart, and repeat thee with his lips, thou wilt 
neither have to dread the sneers of the malignant, nor wilt thou furnish 
parchment coverings for anchovies. If he shall condemn thee, thou mayst 
run forthwith to the stalls of the salt-meat sellers, to have thy back 
scribbled upon by their boys.84
Powerful and wealthy men with large followings were uniquely 
placed to promote the work of an author.85 The business of promotion 
and circulation of an author’s work was undertaken by the circle of 
amici, instead of the booksellers. Through the amici’s connections, 
the author found his readership. The amici praised and circulated the 
books, promoted recitations, and introduced the author’s work to 
other useful friends. In an epigram addressed to his book, Martial 
exclaimed before sending his seventh book of epigrams to the local 
magnate in the Umbrian town of Sarsina: “Oh, what renown is in 
store for me! what glory! what numbers of admirers! You will be 
celebrated at feasts, at the bar, in the temples, the streets, the 
porticoes, the shops. You are sent to one, but you will be read by 
all.”86
D. Scientia Donum Dei Est, Unde Vendi Non Potest
In the sixth century A.D., an attempt to protect the open gift of 
knowledge from private enclosure has been reported to have 
precipitated a civil war.87 During a visit to his ancient master, Abbot 
Finnian, the Irish Saint Columba decided to make a copy of the 
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Abbot’s psalter.88 Apparently, Finnian discovered Saint Columba 
clandestinely at work and demanded the return of the copy made.89
Finnian contended that a copy made without permission belonged to 
the owner of the original.90 Saint Columba refused to surrender the 
copy and the question was demanded to the King of Tara, one 
Diarmid or Dermot.91 The king decided in favor of Finnian by noting 
that “[t]o every book belongs its son-book (or copy), as to every cow 
belongs her calf.”92 Angered with the decision, Columba started a 
rebellion that ended with the defeat of the king.93 For once, copyright 
expansionism did not pay off. The copied manuscript, now on 
display in the Museum of the Royal Irish Academy, was later known 
as the Catach; or Fighter; or Book of Battle. Together with its silver 
case, the book was carried in battle by the O’Donnell clan to ensure 
victory as late as the end of the fifteenth century.94 Saint Columba 
fought a lifelong battle for the right of transcribing other 
manuscripts. Perhaps his quest for open access to others’ works and 
manuscripts played some role in the later capacity of monks to freely 
copy books and preserve ancient knowledge to future generations. 
St. Columba’s strenuous defense of open access to knowledge 
intertwined with the medieval belief that learning was to come as a 
gift. “[K]nowledge is a gift of God and should not be sold,” a 
medieval proverb rang.95 The proverb was actually an interpolation 
into canon law doctrine of a passage of the Book of Matthew in 
which Jesus exhorted the disciples to treat the knowledge they have 
received from him as a gift to be shared. In that passage, Jesus is 
recorded as saying: “Freely ye have received, freely give.”96 Again, 
according to Marie de France, the gift of knowledge was to be left 
open to seed and burst into flower. In the prologue of her tales, Marie 
de France described the productive web of reciprocations of 
knowledge exchange by stating:  
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To Whom God has given science 
And the eloquence of good speech 
Must not be silent or conceal it 
But willingly show it. 
When a great good is heard by many 
Then it begins to seed  
And when it is praised by many  
Then it bursts into flower.97
The medieval canon law doctrine reinforced the Greek ideal 
embedded in the proverbial dictum “Hermodoros trades in tracts.” In 
medieval time, the Greek ideal was applied for a long time to 
storytellers, the sale of notarial and scribal productions, or 
professors, who were to take no fees for their teachings.98 As late as 
the sixteenth century, students at Paris and Montpellier used to 
present gifts, such as banquets, fruits, sweets, and wine, to their 
professors after examinations and disputations.99
The humanist ideal scientia donum dei est, unde vendi non 
potest was also reflected in the reproduction of manuscripts, at least 
within university settings. After universities took over the role of the 
monasteries beginning in the twelfth century,100 they maintained a 
strict open-access policy towards intellectual resources. The 
university regulations excluded property rights over any written 
words by providing that manuscript dealers could not refuse to loan a 
copy to a member of the university even though the loan was 
requested for producing copies.101 Again, the so-called pecia system 
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was an example of a primitive peer-to-peer network, in which the 
copying of manuscripts was perceived as a meritorious and godly 
act.102 The pecia system was originally developed in European 
universities as a regulated procedure to reproduce books and to keep 
their prices as low as possible.103 The peciae were sections into which 
the books were broken and then loaned, usually for a small fee, to be 
copied by students.104 The distribution of the peciae among a large 
number of students working simultaneously permitted completion of 
the copies in a shorter amount of time than a copier working alone 
would have required.105 Even after the emergence of commercial 
scriptoria, university authorities recognized that knowledge was a 
gift of God that should not be sold too dearly by implementing a 
careful regulation of the rates for the rental and sale of 
manuscripts.106 The practice of supplementing the fixed prices with 
presents, rather than money, attested to the continued vitality of gift 
exchange mechanisms, if those prices were thought to be too low.107
A long-lasting tradition of gift exchange emerges in the 
medieval mechanics of book distribution and circulation. 
Traditionally, medieval manuscripts included an illumination of the 
author on bended knee presenting the book to a patron.108 The 
illuminations attested to a tradition of public gift in the exchange of 
books. As reported by Natalie Zemon Davis, gift exchange was the 
dominant modality of the initial diffusion of late-medieval 
writings.109 The author used to send the work to a powerful and 
wealthy person who then sent back a gift, enhanced the lustre of the 
work through his reputation, and defended the work against 
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criticism, if necessary.110 Dedications within the tradition of gift 
exchange still played a relevant role after the advent of the printed 
book, though the character of the dedicated gift changed.111 The 
language and iconography of deference was less marked.112 The 
reciprocations of gifts initially overshadowed the commercial 
relations between authors and publishers. Manuscript and printed 
copy became the object of the gift reciprocation, strengthening a 
collaboration that could provide the publishers with new manuscripts 
in the future. To this end, the French publisher Guillaume Rouillé 
wrote to the literary Domenichi: “Accept this book with the same 
good heart in which you sent it. You presented it to me in a beautiful 
script and with pictures made by hand. I return it to you printed in 
beautiful characters and with engraved illustrations. Think of me . . . 
as your friend and brother.”113
E. Princely Culture, Propaganda, and the Rise of the “Empire of 
Things”
The tension between market and gift economy acquired special 
momentum in the Renaissance. On one side, Renaissance creativity 
is an idealistic public gift to be framed within the values of 
magnificence and magnanimity as the outcome of the special 
relationship between artist and patron. However, Renaissance 
patronage is also a form of consumption that set the emergence of a 
new consumerist market.  
Renaissance patronage ranged from ecclesiastical to lay and 
public to private.114 Guilds, religious fraternities, or committees in 
republican states, such as Venice, are well-known examples of 
corporate patrons.115 Princely patronage lay at the intersection 
between public and private patronage. At court, kings or princes may 
have taken artists, writers, and musicians into their service on a 
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permanent basis or, alternatively, the artist may have worked on 
commission—keeping a shop, awaiting for the patrons’ call, and 
seeking his reward.116 Together with these dominant so-called 
household and made-to-measure systems, however, a market system 
was emerging, in which the artist or writer tried to sell something 
“ready-made” directly to the public.117
Friendship and personal relations played an important role, as 
art patronage was part of a larger patron–client system.118 Within the 
framework of these relationships, gift exchange may have had a role 
well into the Renaissance. For example, Baccio Bandinelli, a 
sixteenth-century Tuscan artist, introduced himself to the brothers 
Giovanni and Giuliano de’Medici by offering them a gift and 
receiving a commission in return.119 Commissions from patrons, 
however, were generally obtained by self-promotion, through 
intermediaries, or occasionally through formal competitions, such as 
in the case of the Baptistery doors in Florence.120
Especially competitive environments, such as Florence, 
boosted artistic innovation by forcing artists to capture the patrons’ 
attention by devising new and imaginative solutions to their 
problems.121 “Vasari [reported] that Michelangelo’s Battle of Cascina
was done ‘in competition’ with Leonardo’s Battle of Anghiari.”122
The finally unfinished works were commissioned in 1503-1504 for 
the walls of the great hall of the Palazzo Vecchio, where the two 
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artists were supposed to work face to face in a sublime contest for 
beauty.123 At the same time, patrons competed among themselves for 
enjoying the services of the best artists in order to achieve fame, 
prestige, and political recognition through magnificence and 
“magnanimity.”124 In trying to convince Giovanni de’ Medici to 
rebuild the whole church of San Lorenzo, Brunelleschi described the 
mechanics of competition at work on the patrons’ side:
I am amazed that you, being a leader (capo) do not order the spending of 
few thousand scudi and build the body of the church if [the noble families 
of the neighbourhood] saw you begin they would follow with their 
chapels; especially since when no other memorial remains of us but ruins, 
they bear witness to the man who build them (di chi n’è stato autore)
hundreds or thousands of years before.125
The same mechanics were at work in the Italian communes, where 
often the rulers flattered the vanity of townspeople to surpass other 
communities, thus convincing the citizens to pay for the work of art 
in the end, as in the case of the erection of the Milan Cathedral.126
In the Renaissance’s “empire of things,” however, where the 
multiplication of cultural artifacts reached an unprecedented extent, 
the market acquired special relevance and artistic consumption 
became a notable economic activity.127 In Florence, the workshop of 
“Lippi and Pesellino Imitator” proved the emergence of a process of 
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the Renaissance, especially in Italy, is to be regarded as a form of consumption that 
reached a unique qualitative and quantitative extent and is to be contextualized 
within the emergence of an “empire of things,” a consumer society that “had its first 
stirrings, if not its birth, in the new habits of spending that possessed the Italians in 
the Renaissance” and “these habits . . . set[] Italy off, economically as well as 
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commodification of creativity that was packaged in multiple 
products to suit the needs of a range of consumers in an expanding 
market.128 Initially, in Early Renaissance, as Hauser noted, “the 
market is . . . not yet determined by the supply but by the demand.”129
By the High Renaissance, however, a new relevant change in the 
appreciation of art came about. Artists and patrons came together on 
the common ground of connoisseurship of art.130 Departing from a 
long tradition viewing art only for the purpose that it addressed, art 
came to be appreciated as an end itself.131 This primitive form of l’art 
pour l’art had relevant effects on the market for creativity.132 The 
emergence of the amateur, the connoisseur, and the collector created 
a new type of consumer willing to buy what was offered, rather than 
only order what he needed.133 At the same time, the rise of the status 
of the artists from artisans to “divine stars” led to an increasing 
emancipation from direct commissions. The super-artist no longer 
felt compelled to seek the patrons’ protection by conscientiously 
carrying out their orders, but began to undertake artistic tasks on his 
own.134 Dürer discussed profit from the production of artworks as 
nobody else in the past. In a letter dated August 29, 1509 to Jacob 
Heller, Dürer motivated his final decision to choose engravings as 
his privileged medium of expression with the desire to earn the more 
lucrative returns: 
In one year, I can make a pile of common pictures, . . . so that no one 
would believe it possible that one man could do them all. One can earn 
something on these. But assiduous, hair-splitting labor gives little in 
return. That’s why I am going to devote myself to engravings. And had I 
done so earlier, I would be today one thousand florins richer.135
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In the sixteenth century, the art market became even more 
important. Merchants specialized in dealing with these new 
commodities and art dealers, such as Giovanni Battista della Palla in 
Florence or Giovanni Ram in Venice, made their appearance.136
Artists exhibited their works at fairs—like the Ascension Week fair 
in Venice or the Saint Anthony fair at Padua—or other public 
places.137 Advertising came to be used to boost the sale of the new 
commodities. Echoing a similar statement in one of Martial’s 
epigrams several centuries earlier, Ludovico Ariosto reminded his 
readers in the Orlando Furioso that “[w]hoever wants to buy a 
Furioso, or another work by the same author, let him go to the press 
of the Bindoni twins, the brothers Benedetto and Agostino.”138
With the advent of print, quite understandably, the market 
played an increasingly relevant role in the literary field. By the end 
of the fifteenth century, the commodification and standardization in 
size and price of the book was emerging.139 The invention of printing 
affected the organization of literature with the creation of new 
occupations, such as librarians, editors, and correctors.140 Towards 
the mid-sixteenth century, the professional writer came on the scene 
because of printers and publishers asking writers to write, edit, or 
translate books.141 In Venice, Pietro Aretino exemplified this 
emerging market-oriented professional writer. Beside being known 
for having marketed even his “private” letters, Aretino’s 
professionalism seemed to free him from traditional patronage 
models.142 After wandering from court to court for several years, in 
1527 Aretino moved to Venice, where he was almost independent, 
although the “protection from Doge Andrea Gritti and gifts from” 
Venetian aristocrats were still valuable assets he could count on.143
The rise of the market and his exceptional writing and self-
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advertisement skills gave Aretino the opportunity to detach himself 
from patrons that may have become too invasive and exclusive.144
F. Guez de Balzac, Gracefulness, and Interpersonal Relations 
In a letter written July 15, 1621 from Jean-Luis Guez de Balzac 
to Cardinal La Valette, Guez de Balzac wrote:  
Your banker has just delivered the sum that you ordered him to give 
me. . . . I would like to be able to thank you in an appropriate manner for 
this favor, but besides the fact that your generosity is too great and that 
you give so gracefully that you further enhance the value of your gifts, I 
would be presumptuous if I believed that any words I might say could 
match your actions. . . . I can say nevertheless without vanity that I have 
never been tempted by anything so base as a desire for material gain. I 
thus consider your generosity stripped down to its essence, and I cherish 
your esteem for me more than anything else, since it is a token of my 
merit, not my lack of means, and it comes from your judgment, which is 
greater than your fortune.145
Guez de Balzac’s letter has become a quintessential representation of 
the question of the gift and its relation to literary patronage. The 
letter is a manifesto against the impersonal logic of the market. The 
graceful performance of La Valette makes his gift something hardly 
calculable in term of loss and gain. Still, perhaps for the last time, the 
gift exchange challenged the premises of market economy based on 
calculation and self-interest.  
The gift received by Guez de Balzac was primarily an 
instrument to establish and maintain social ties. In this sense, the gift 
that the patron offered to the protégé sealed the network of 
interpersonal relations that supported creativity throughout history. 
As Marcel Mauss noted, gifts lie at the intersection of the economic 
and the social and blur the distinction between people and things.146
Specifically referring to gift exchange in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, Natalie Zemon Davis elaborated Mauss’s 
insight by arguing that the true role of the gift was to open up 
“channels of communication . . . across boundaries of status and 
literacy” and give “expression to the highly strained but genuine 
reciprocity between unequals in the social and economic order.”147 In 
Exchanging Gifts: the Elizabethan Currency of Children and Poetry,
                                                     
144. See id. at 124. 
145. PETER W. SHOEMAKER, POWERFUL CONNECTIONS: THE POETICS OF 
PATRONAGE IN THE AGE OF LOUIS XIII 72-73 (2007). 
146. MAUSS, supra note 4, at 44-45.  
147. DAVIS, supra note 113, at 42. 
2008 Michigan State Law Review  [Vol:St.Pg] 
Patricia Fumerton explains the value of the gift in literary exchange 
as a form of social currency that equalizes hierarchical differences.148
In doing so, Fumerton noted that dedications of poetic works  
hover on the threshold of [the] gift. . . . [P]oet and patron are 
simultaneously givers and takers, parents and children—both partners reap 
the sustaining communion of gift. In this sense, these “gift” dedications 
are as much equalizers as definers of hierarchical differences: both poet 
and patron enter the gift circle that consumes and dilates egos, mingling 
selves in the hope of self-growth, peace, and culture.149
Actually, the print medium helped this equalizing gift 
exchange. In the early history of print culture, the efficacy of the 
print medium memorialized authors and patrons simultaneously by 
presenting authors not simply as dependents, but also as parties to a 
cultural exchange.150 Print publications portrayed members of royalty 
and aristocracy as the authorizers and protectors of literary texts.151
Writers and publishers were correspondingly provided with the 
patrons’ “legitimacy, reward, and prestige.”152
Despite the many critiques to the role of patronage in the 
ancien régime,153 patronage turned out to be a dynamic cultural and 
intellectual force that fashioned the “literary ‘selves’ and even 
‘communities’” because, as Shoemaker noted, “it was flexible and 
relatively diffuse, because it did not depend on rigid institutional 
hierarchies, and because it mobilized both self-interest and 
idealism.”154
However, change was coming. Although the process had a 
different pace depending on the location and subject matter of artistic 
production, at least in the literary field—by the early part of the 
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seventeenth century—the old system of artistic clientage started to 
break down, and the reader came on the scene.155 Due to the 
restricted resources of the aristocracy, the writers could expect little 
financial reward in exchange for dedications.156 The economics of the 
emerging publishing industry also changed the patrons’ traditional
functions, as inherited from manuscript culture. Publishers used 
patrons’ names to promote books’ sales to a general readership, 
rather than to signal actual patronage.157 Although the patronage 
system still offered some social and political benefits, the emerging 
authority of the author and the importance of the reader—especially 
the “educated ‘Gentlemen’” becoming the real socio-literary center 
of culture—ultimately eclipsed the patron.158
By the mid-eighteenth century, the transition was almost 
complete. Modern forms of cultural support, such as commercial 
publishing and state patronage, substitute the highly personalized 
culture of patronage.159 The old patronage model underwent a phase 
of rapid decadence, as Jean le Rond d’Alembert discussed in an 
essay written in 1753.160 In his “cynical portrait of the personal 
relationship[s] between men of letter and aristocratic[]” patrons, 
d’Alembert noted that the alliance between authors and aristocrats 
“revealed to be a ploy of vanity.”161 Price tables for different kinds of 
dedications represented the culmination of the system’s decadence.162
In reaction to these practices, d’Alembert spelled out the modern 
equation of aesthetic value: “If you want to demonstrate your 
abilities, you should not limit yourself to writing for a small circle of 
friends or accommodating admirers; instead, you should . . . expose 
your work to the light of public opinion[;] . . . [a] man who feels that 
his talents and genius should earn him fame need only let public 
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opinion do its work.”163 At the very same time, on February 7, 1755, 
Samuel Johnson spat out all his outrage against an increasingly 
decadent patronage system. Dr. Johnson’s letter to Philip Dormer 
Stanhope, fourth Earl of Chesterfield, marked the acquired 
independence of the author from affiliation to an aristocratic 
patron.164 Johnson could turn his back to the delusional love with the 
Earl of Chesterfield because a new lover, far more rewarding, had 
come on the scene: the market. Soon thereafter, in the 
Encyclopédie’s entry of “men of letters,” Voltaire sanctioned the 
transition to a newer system of financial support of creativity: 
Men of letters . . . are ordinarily more independent-minded that other men, 
and those who are born without a fortune to their name can easily use the 
foundations created by Luis XIV to strengthen this independence; we no 
longer see, as we once did, dedicatory epistles offered up to vanity by self-
interest and servility.165
The impersonal royal patronage offered more independence 
than the informal networks of nobiliary patronage. The Académie 
Française was one such example of institutionalized patronage that 
reduced some of the uncertainties and ambiguities of patronage 
culture and contributed to the literary space’s “autonomization.”166
Impersonality and rationality would later characterize modern state 
patronage. As Shoemaker noted, however, “[p]atronage did not 
disappear in the eighteenth century . . . . The specifically local 
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informal, particularistic, and hierarchical patronage characteristic of 
the early seventeenth-century, however, became progressively less 
visible and central to the self-image of writers and patrons.”167
G. The Rhetoric of the Gift Shaping the Question of Literary 
Property  
In 1586, Simon Marion, a French barrister, sought before the 
Royal Council the annulment of a royal privilege over a work of 
Antoine Muret.168 In order to seek the annulment, Marion promoted 
the emergence of the notion of authorial property. He famously 
stated that as “by a common instinct, each man recognises every 
other to be the master of what he makes, invents, or creates . . . . 
[T]he author of a book is entirely its master” in the same terms God 
is the master of his creations.169 However, following the Latin 
tradition that “oratio publicata res libera est,”170 Marion 
acknowledged that publication ended the property right enjoyed by 
the author in his work.171 In other words, the act of publishing the 
work made it a gift to the public. Notwithstanding the emergence of 
the market, the construction of creativity as a gift exchange still 
justified the entire privilege system. According to Marion, the 
privilege was the return gift granted by the State, on behalf of the 
public, within the context of a tacit social contract.172 As a result, 
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pleading against renewed or perpetual privileges, Marion noted, “[I]t 
is ungrateful to contravene the law of benefit, and to attempt to steal 
from the public sphere something which the munificence of its 
creator has put there, in order to appropriate it for oneself.”173
The rhetoric of the gift still resounded powerfully from the 
nebula of the past in the constitutional moment of modern copyright 
law. At the time of the British “battle of the booksellers,” Justice 
Yates—one of the finest pleaders against perpetuity—notoriously 
employed the gift metaphor once again by noting that, from the 
moment of publication, literary works are thrown into a state of 
universal communion; “like land thrown into the highway, it is 
become a gift to the public.”174 In 1774, the House of Lords ruled out 
perpetuity of literary property in a case brought by the Scottish 
publisher Alexander Donaldson against the Londonian publisher 
Thomas Beckett.175 Lord Cadmen addressed the House of Lords by 
noting that “science and learning are in their nature publici juris, and 
they ought to be as free and general as air or water.”176 The discourse 
about the gift and communal knowledge won the day, and 
Donaldson shaped the future of copyright law. 
In France, again, Jean-François Gaultier’s social contract made 
the mechanics of the gift and return gift the rationale for authors’ 
protection. As Gaultier and, in part, Condorcet argued, raw materials 
of creativity come from a common and cumulative pool of cultural 
resources.177 Individual creativity was the result of the author 
drawing from these common resources. Therefore, each author was 
indebted to society for the gift of this common knowledge. In order 
to repay this debt, Gaultier and Condorcet assumed that once a work 
is published, it belongs to everyone, rather than to the author or the 
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publisher.178 For his original contribution to the cumulative stock of 
cultural resources, the author would be entitled to receive a reward: 
We do not claim here to go against the just property which belongs to 
genius. Nothing belongs to us more than that which our labours, our 
devices, our observations and our calculations have allowed us to discover 
or imagine. But once we have received payment for them, be it in money, 
or in glory, all our fellow citizens, all men, have the right to freely enjoy 
the gift that we have given them.179
The traditional mechanics of gift exchange aiming at 
preserving a situation of everlasting and reciprocal indebtedness 
characterize Gaultier’s social contract. Individual contributions to the 
cumulative pool of knowledge would serve to return the initial gift 
endowed by the society to the individual author. Society then would 
provide individual authors with a return gift—“be it in money, or in 
glory”—to keep the mechanics of gift exchange in motion.180
Gaultier emphasized the reputational value of the individual 
contribution so typical of a gift exchange model. Glory and 
reputation are valued as instruments of payment as much as money. 
The endowment of the publication to the public would provide added 
value to the author “for the more a Book will be multiplied and 
spread, the more the Author will find strength in the welcome of the 
Public and in the judgement that the large numbers of Readers will 
have made of it, to rework and improve his Work.”181
In 1791, Le Chapelier powerfully restated Marion’s ideas 
before the French Parliament. Le Chapelier warned that “[t]he most 
sacred, the most legitimate, the most unassailable, [and] if I may say 
so, the most personal of all properties, is the work, the fruit of the 
mind of a writer; yet it is a property of a totally different kind than 
other properties.”182 Le Chapelier continued by arguing that once the 
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work is disclosed to the public, “it seems that from this moment, the 
writer has associated the public with his property, or rather he has 
transferred it entirely to it.”183 Therefore, Le Chapelier concluded that 
the author’s work is public property, and its disposal is under the 
author’s dominion for the term established by law: 
[A]s it is highly fair that the men who cultivate the domain of the mind, 
retrieve some fruits from their work . . . . But also, after the fixed delay, 
the property of the public commences, [and] everyone has to be able to 
print, publish the works which have contributed to enlighten the human 
spirit.184
There are striking similarities between Thomas Jefferson and 
Le Chapelier’s warnings. Jefferson summed up the copyright 
utilitarian view by endorsing much of Le Chapelier’s conclusions 
regarding the public and communal nature of knowledge: 
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of 
exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea 
. . . . He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself 
without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light 
without darkening me.185
Jefferson concluded by saying that intellectual property rights 
might be necessary and “[s]ociety may give an exclusive right to the 
profit arising from [inventions] as an encouragement to men to 
pursue ideas which may produce utility.”186 In his last book Common 
as Air, Lewis Hyde stressed the focus of the U.S. founders on 
“collectively valued ends,” rather than private wealth on matters 
related to creativity.187 Again, the wording of the Jefferson Warning 
closely resembled the Medieval and Renaissance language of gift 
exchange in the circulation of knowledge and books. A dedication by 
Pierre Robert Olivétan for his translation of the Bible in 1535 
recited: “[This dedicated Bible] is made only to be given and 
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communicated . . . it enriches those to whom it is given, but does not 
impoverish in any way those who give it.”188 Actually, the discourse 
about the gift, which shaped the emergence of copyright law, is 
nowhere to be found on the radar of modern copyright policy 
discourse. 
II. PROPERTIZATION AND COMMONS 
A. The Road to Propertization and the Digital Land Grab 
From the time of Pindar and Simonides—and until 
Romanticism commenced a process leading to the complete 
commodification of creativity—market exchange models ran parallel 
to gift exchange. Commodification developed steadily from the 
emergence of the Roman scribal publishing industry to the rise of the 
“empire of things” in the Renaissance and the expansion of the 
“privileged” printing industry. The market took over almost entirely 
by the beginning of the nineteenth century.189 In the past, “law and 
economics scholars . . . launched a crusade to expose the evil of the 
commons—the evil . . . of not propertizing.”190 Since Harold 
Demsetz, economists have viewed property rights as a desirable tool 
to internalize the full social value of people’s actions and therefore 
maximize the incentive to engage in those actions.191 An influential 
article written by Garret Hardin in 1968 termed the evil of not 
                                                     
188. Davis, supra note 97, at 80 (citing LA BIBLE. QUI EST TOUTE LA 
SAINCTE ESCRIPTURE (Pierre Robert Olivétan trans., 1535)). 
189. See Mark Rose, Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright 
Debates and the Rhetoric of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 85 
(2003) (noting that since its inception, the public domain discourse was 
comparatively weak against the rhetoric of property, as the law is mostly about 
property, or as the adage has it, possession is nine-tenths of the law). 
190. Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public 
Domain, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1331, 1332 (2004); see H. Scott Gordon, The Economic 
Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954); 
Anthony Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL. ECON. 
116 (1955) (introducing an economic analysis of fisheries that demonstrated that 
unlimited harvesting of high-demand fish by multiple individuals is both 
economically and environmentally unsustainable); see also Lee Anne Fennell, 
Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 35 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011); 
Chander & Sunder, supra, at 1332-33 (discussing the move toward propertization).  
191. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM.
ECON. REV. 347 (1967); see also Eli M. Salzberger, Economic Analysis of the Public 
Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN 
INFORMATION LAW 27, 33-36 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006). 
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propertizing as the tragedy of the commons.192 The subject of 
Hardin’s essay was the carrying capacity of the commons and its 
limits.193 Hardin identified the tragedy of the commons in the 
environmental dysfunctions of overuse and underinvestment found in 
the absence of a private property regime.194 Hardin made it clear that 
any commons open to all, ungoverned by custom or law, will 
eventually collapse.195 Hardin’s analysis shaped the debate to 
come.196 The fear of the tragedy of the commons propelled the idea 
that more property rights necessarily lead to the production of more 
information along with the enhancement of their diversity. In this 
perspective, the prevailing assumption is that anything of value 
within the public domain should be commodified. This “cultural 
stewardship model,” as Julie Cohen termed it,197 regarded ownership 
as the prerequisite of productive management, assumed that any 
commons is inefficient, and promoted the idea that opposing the 
expansion of intellectual property is a mistake in economic terms.198
As Paul Goldstein put it:  
[T]he best prescription for connecting authors to their audiences is to 
extend rights into every corner where consumers derive value from literary 
and artistic works. If history is any measure, the results should be to 
promote political as well as cultural diversity, ensuring a plenitude of 
voices, all with the chance to be heard.199  
This statement justifies the recent tremendous expansion of 
intellectual property rights. 
In recent years, however, a revisionist moment has started to 
ponder whether our copyright policies struck the right balance 
                                                     
192. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243
(1968).
193. See id. at 1244.  
194. See id.  
195. See id.  
196. See James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 7 (2003) (noting that “any discussion of intellectual property or 
the public domain proceeds in the shadow of the ‘the tragedy of the commons’”).
197. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating 
the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 191, at 121,
134-35.
198. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003). 
199. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE 
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 216 (2003); see also R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be 
Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
995, 995 (2003) (arguing that “increasing the appropriability of information goods is 
likely to increase, rather than diminish, the quantity of ‘open’ information”).
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between protection, incentives to creation, access to knowledge, and 
finally, the circulation and cumulative production of knowledge. 
Modern technological advancement has increasingly disoriented the 
coordinates upon which the solution of the copyright paradox should 
be calculated and exacerbated the tension within it.200 Scholars and 
the civil society have warned that “[w]e are in the midst of an 
enclosure movement in our information environment.”201 Professor 
James Boyle has talked about a second enclosure movement that is 
now enclosing the “commons of the mind.”202 Similar to the natural 
commons, fields, grazing lands, forests, and streams—which were 
enclosed in the sixteenth to nineteenth century in England by 
landowners and the state—the relentless expansion of intellectual 
property rights is enclosing the intellectual commons.203 In a very 
similar fashion, Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite have spoken of 
“information feudalism.”204 As in the case of medieval feudalism, a 
redistribution of property rights involves a transfer of knowledge 
from the intellectual commons to “media conglomerates and 
integrated life sciences corporations rather than individual scientists 
and authors.”205 Authors argued that a mix of technology and 
legislation promotes this process of “commodification of 
                                                     
200. See BOYLE, supra note 185, at 54-82 (discussing the reaction to and the 
misperception of the “Internet threat”).
201. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment 
Constraints on the Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 354 
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domain. See David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP.
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Copyright: Proposals and Prospects, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 831 (1966), and Stephen 
Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970). 
202. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the 
Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003); BOYLE,
supra note 185, at 42-53; see also Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The 
Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public 
Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279 (2004); DAVID BOLLIER, SILENT THEFT: THE PRIVATE 
PLUNDER OF OUR COMMON WEALTH (2002).
203. See Boyle, supra note 202, at 33-37.
204. See PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM:
WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002). 
205. Id. at 2-3.
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information.”206 According to P. Bernt Hugenholtz and Lucie 
Guibault, “[i]tems of information, which in the ‘old’ economy had 
little or no economic value, such as factual data, personal data, 
genetic information and pure ideas, have acquired independent 
economic value in the current information age, and consequently 
become the object of property rights making the information a 
tradable commodity.”207 The commodification of information is 
propelled by the ability of new technologies to capture resources 
previously unowned and unprotected, as in a new digital land grab.208
Professor Elinor Ostrom and her colleague Charlotte Hess reinforced 
this point by arguing that “[i]nformation that used to be ‘free’ is now 
increasingly being privatized, monitored, encrypted, and restricted. 
The enclosure is caused by the conflicts and contradictions between 
intellectual property laws and the expanded capacities of new 
technologies.”209 Extreme propertization and commodification of 
information seems to be a counterintuitive option for the networked 
information society in light of the opportunities that digitization and 
Internet distribution offer. As Professor Paul David argued: 
Today, the greater capacity for the dissemination of knowledge, for 
cultural creativity and for scientific research carried out by means of the 
enhanced facilities of computer-mediated telecommunication networks, 
has greatly raised the marginal social losses that are attributable to the 
restrictions that those adjustments in the copyright law have placed upon 
the domain of information search and exploitation.210
                                                     
206. See Neil Weinstock Netanel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Introduction: The 
Commodification of Information, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION, at viii 
(Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002). 
207. P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Lucie Guibault, The Future of the Public 
Domain: An Introduction, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 191, at 
1, 1. 
208. See Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction: An Overview of the 
Knowledge Commons, in UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS: FROM 
THEORY TO PRACTICE 3, 12 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2007); see also
Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED (Jan. 1, 1996, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper_pr.html. 
209. Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: 
Information as a Common-Pool Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 112 
(2003).  
210. Paul A. David & Jared Rubin, Restricting Access to Books on the 
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B. Commons, Tragedies, and Comedies  
Actually, there seem to be sustainable options to the road to 
propertization, especially in light of the value of open access in the 
digital environment.211 Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom powerfully 
advocated the cause of the commons against the mantra of 
propertization. Ostrom’s works showed the inaccuracies of Hardin’s 
tragedy of the commons.212 Empirical studies, which Ostrom has 
spearheaded, showed that groups of people can effectively manage 
common resources under “suitable conditions, such as appropriate 
rules, good conflict-resolution mechanisms, and well-defined group 
boundaries.”213 Under suitable conditions and proper governance, the 
tragedy of the commons becomes “the comedy of the commons.”214
This is especially true for cultural commons.215 Culture, in fact, 
stands as a quintessential example of comedic commons because it is 
enriched through reference the more people consume it.216 This is 
                                                     
211. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of the Public Domain: 
Markets in Information Goods Versus the Marketplace of Ideas, in EXPANDING THE 
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214. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and 
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 767-68 (1986) (arguing that the 
commons, rather than ineludibly turning into a tragedy of underproduction, may turn 
into a comedy of efficient production if managed through the appropriate rules). 
215. See GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS (Brett M. Frischmann, Michael 
J. Madison & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2014) (updating and expanding Elinor 
Ostrom’s research framework, to provide a general perspective on commons 
governance for information, knowledge, and culture and to adapt Ostrom’s work 
from natural resources to knowledge resources). 
216. See Lawrence Lessig, Re-Crafting a Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 56, 64 (2006).  
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because the carrying capacity of cultural commons is endless and 
cultural commons are non-rivalrous. Unlike eating an apple, my 
listening of a song does not subtract from another’s. Therefore, 
cultural commons unveil the inaccuracy of the tragedy of the 
commons more than any other commons. The cultural commons’ 
comedic nature undermines the argument that the market will always 
serve us well.217 As traditional economic analysis à la Adam Smith 
goes, propertization should aid market forces that manage efficiently 
scarce resources.218 Propertization should facilitate transactions by 
defining and evaluating assets and thus making them transferable. 
Nevertheless, traditional market principles may become inefficient 
when applied to cultural commons that are never by nature scarce. 
As the argument goes, rather than being a solution to manage 
efficiently scarce resources, propertization and enclosure in the 
cultural domain may be a wasteful option by cutting down social and 
economic positive externalities219—especially in peer-based 
production environments. Actually, reviewing the peculiar nature of 
cultural commons, the academic literature developed the idea of the 
tragedy of the anti-commons,220 which lies in the underuse of scarce 
scientific resources because of excessive intellectual property rights 
and all related transaction costs.221 This is the case, for example, of 
overpatenting in biomedical research.222
Cultural commons are valuable from several perspectives. 
First, the public domain plays a relevant role in terms of market 
efficiency. From an economic standpoint, a market with a shrinking 
public domain would be especially inefficient. Nobel laureate Joseph 
Stiglitz stressed this point by noting that: 
                                                     
217. See Cultural Commons, LEWIS HYDE, http://www.lewishyde.com/in-
progress/cultural-commons (last visited Feb. 9, 2016). 
218. See Rose, supra note 214, at 711-12.
219. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 257 (2007). 
220. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in 
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221. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW 
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222. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). 
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It is imperative to understand the ways in which the production and 
distribution of knowledge and information differs from that of goods like 
steel and cars. . . . The fact that knowledge is, in central ways, a public 
good and that there are important externalities means that exclusive or 
excessive reliance on the market may not result in economic efficiency.223
Restricting access to information would increase the inefficiency of 
the market because perfect information makes the perfect market.224
A market that commodifies information excessively will be less 
efficient in allocating resources in our society since key information 
to facilitate that allocation will be more difficult to find.225 Second, 
the public domain is an engine of democratization by ensuring 
proper access to information regardless of the market power of the 
players. This democratic value of the public domain has been 
immensely enhanced by the ubiquity of the interconnected society 
and the power of propagation of digital networks.226 Third, 
propertization reduces the “public domain effect,” which is the value 
produced by a work entering into the public domain and the 
decreased deadweight loss coming from restricting access to it.227
Fourth, business models based on open access and public domain 
approaches would produce considerable economic and social value228
on many different levels.229 In the case of file sharing, for example, 
several studies found significant benefits of free access.230 Open 
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source software also exemplifies the value of an open approach to 
the production of information goods. The Internet and the World 
Wide Web are further examples of the great wealth that can be built 
upon open access models. These technologies were non-proprietary, 
and openness was the key to their revolutionary success. Again, 
online search engines, such as Google, produce relevant social 
benefits through their service and generate very large revenue by 
copying “open” information on the web.231 Several studies 
highlighted that a public domain approach to weather, geographical 
data, and public sector information in general may yield a substantial 
long-run value, running into the tens of billions or hundreds of 
billions of dollars.232 A recent study showed that industries based on 
or benefiting from fair use and copyright exceptions exceeded GDP, 
employment, productivity, and export growth of the overall 
economy.233 Further, the study revealed that fair use industries have 
grown dramatically within the past twenty years, since the advent of 
the Internet and the digital information revolution.234 These data may 
suggest that in the digital environment, open access and public 
domain business models may spur growth at a faster pace than 
traditional, proprietary business models. 
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C. Mass Collaboration, Decentralization, and Openness  
Boosted by technological innovation, collaboration is regaining 
its natural role in human interactions. Recent empirical research 
found that rather than the Homo economicus, we are “a cooperative 
species.”235 Men are complex entities that cannot be explained only 
through economic incentives; instead, several other factors come into 
play, such as altruism.236 In his recent book Together, social scientist 
Richard Sennett emphasizes the role of collaboration in human life 
and reminds readers that “cooperation precedes individuation: 
cooperation is the foundation of human development, in that we 
learn how to be together before we learn how to stand apart.”237
Building upon Émile Durkheim’s and Marcel Mauss’s works,238
emerging anti-utilitarian schools designed and promoted a “new 
political economy,” whose specificity 
is to link together the question of the political and religious foundation of 
societies with the question of the gift, of recognition and of the building of 
individual and collective identities. Its main hypothesis is that men are not 
only self-interested animals, eager only to get and own more and more 
things and riches, but that first of all they desire to be recognized . . . . The 
anti-utilitarian hypothesis is that Human beings’ first desire is to be 
recognized and valued as givers.239
                                                     
235. See SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, A COOPERATIVE SPECIES:
HUMAN RECIPROCITY AND ITS EVOLUTION (2011); see also New Economic Thinking, 
The Death of “Homo Economicus,” YOUTUBE (June 19, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ParPPYMzfQM&feature=youtu.be; ADAM 
SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1759); cf. JEREMY RIFKIN, THE ZERO 
MARGINAL COST SOCIETY: THE INTERNET OF THINGS, THE COLLABORATIVE 
COMMONS, AND THE ECLIPSE OF CAPITALISM (2014) [hereinafter RIFKIN, THE ZERO 
MARGINAL COST SOCIETY]; JEREMY RIFKIN, THE EMPATHIC CIVILIZATION: THE RACE 
TO GLOBAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN A WORLD IN CRISIS (2009); The Zeitgeist Movement 
Defined: Realizing a New Train of Thought, THE ZEITGEIST MOVEMENT,
http://thezeitgeistmovement.com/orientation (last visited Feb 9, 2016). 
236. See The Zeitgeist Movement Defined, supra note 235. 
237. See RICHARD SENNETT, TOGETHER: THE RITUALS, PLEASURES AND 
POLITICS OF COOPERATION 13 (2012). 
238. See ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (Steven 
Lukes ed., W.D. Hall trans., Free Press 2014) (1893) (assuming that humans are 
inherently egoistic but our collective consciousness, which is composed by norms, 
beliefs and values, overrides our egoism; in particular, according to Durkheim, it is 
the emotional part of our collective consciousness, culture, that overrides self-
interest); MAUSS, supra note 4. 
239. CAILLÉ, supra note 5, at 7; see also, e.g., ALAIN CAILLÉ, CRITIQUE DE LA 
RAISON UTILITAIRE (1989).  
2024 Michigan State Law Review  [Vol:St.Pg] 
From Life in a Day (Ridley Scott’s collaborative YouTube 
movie)240 and virtual choirs241 to volunteer astronomers looking for 
new galaxies in the Galaxy Zoo,242 taxonomists classifying images 
from collections of herbarium specimens in the Herbaria@home
project,243 or millions of users enlisting in the SETI@Home project to 
search for signs of extraterrestrial life244—online collaboration has 
projected granular individual contributions in the kaleidoscopic 
multiplier of the Net.245 Likewise, collaborative authorship and social 
editing in Wikipedia and wiki environments have become 
increasingly influential models for content creation and 
dissemination, so that commentators are now talking about 
wikinomics or wikiborg.246 Sharing is a contagious process insofar as 
it has rapidly exploded on a previously unimaginable scale.247 It 
reaches beyond creative endeavors by moving to more and more 
areas of our lives. Recent research highlights the rise of collaborative 
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consumption.248 Swapping, sharing, bartering, trading, and renting 
have been reinvented through technology and peer-to-peer 
communities. Collaborative consumption is rising in enormous 
marketplaces, such as eBay and Craigslist, and emerging sectors 
such as peer-to-peer money lending (Zopa);249 “swap trading” 
(Swap);250 car sharing (Zipcar);251 ridesharing (Zimride);252 apartment 
sharing (Airbnb);253 skills sharing (Skillshare);254 time sharing 
(TaskRabbit);255 land sharing (Landshare);256 kid clothes sharing 
(thredUP);257 or anything else you may need (Share Anything).258
In cyberspace, human intelligence has become collective 
through user-generated mass collaboration,259 which—as several 
authors have increasingly noted—may produce social and economic 
enrichment to a far greater extent than in the past.260 The power of 
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WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS (2008); DAVID WEINBERGER, EVERYTHING IS
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online collective intelligence may challenge the individualistic, post-
romantic, creative paradigm; promoting the return of a pre-modern 
communitarian and collective approach to creativity and the 
emergence of a new cultural landscape.261 Digital creativity is mass 
collaborative, shared, open, user-generated, and remixed. David 
Bollier described the Internet revolution as a monumental shift: 
I believe we are moving into a new kind of cultural if not economic 
reality. We are moving away from a world organized around centralized 
control, strict intellectual property rights and hierarchies of credentialed 
experts, to a radically different order. The new order is predicated upon 
open access, decentralized participation, and cheap and easy sharing.262
Yochai Benkler defined the high generative capacity of online 
commons as the “wealth of networks.”263 In The Wealth of Networks,
Benkler wrote: “Radical decentralization of intelligence in our 
communications network and the centrality of information, 
knowledge, culture, and ideas to advanced economic activity are 
leading to a new stage of the information economy—the networked 
information economy.”264 Benkler qualified the concept by saying 
that “[w]hat characterizes the networked information economy is that 
decentralized individual action—specifically, new and important 
cooperative and coordinate action carried out through radically 
distributed, nonmarket mechanisms that do not depend on 
proprietary strategies—plays a much greater role than it did, or could 
have, in the industrial information economy.”265
The wealth of networks lies in networked peer production that 
is highly generative because it is modular, granular, and cheap to 
integrate the results.266 To borrow Jerome Reichman’s categories, 
new forms of innovation allow the transformation of small grains of 
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information and innovation into distributed and collective forms of 
intelligence.267 As Benkler puts it: 
the networked environment makes possible a new modality of organizing 
production: radically decentralized, collaborative, and nonproprietary; 
based on sharing resources and outputs among widely distributed, loosely 
connected individuals who cooperate with each other without relying on 
either market signals or managerial commands. This is what I call 
“commons-based peer production.”268
According to Benkler, the networked information economy improves 
individual capacities in three ways. First, individuals can “do more 
for and by themselves.”269 Second, the networked information 
economy enhances individuals’ “capacity to do more in loose 
commonality with others, without being constrained to organize their 
relationship through a price system or in traditional hierarchical 
models.”270 Finally, “it improves the capacity of individuals to do 
more in formal organizations that operate outside the market 
sphere.”271
The new economics of digital distribution democratized 
innovation.272 Flexibility, decentralization, cooperative creation, and 
customization out-performed corporate bureaucracies that were 
unwilling to experiment because it was thought to be too risky and 
costly. The Charter for Innovation, Creativity and Access to 
Knowledge declares:  
We are in the midst of a revolution in the way that knowledge and 
culture are created, accessed and transformed. Citizens, artists and 
consumers are no longer powerless and isolated in the face of the content 
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production and distribution industries: now individuals across many 
different spheres collaborate, participate and decide.273
In the networked information economy, innovation and creativity are 
becoming independent from centralized company environments. 
According to Neil Netanel, “[m]ajor film studios, record labels, 
television and radio broadcasters, and print publishers came to 
dominate our cultural landscape because they have the funds and 
infrastructure to mass-produce, package, and distribute authors’ 
creations. But digital technology radically changes that equation by 
drastically reducing the cost of production and distribution.”274
In the emerging ecosystem of “commons-based peer 
production,” open access models play a pivotal role. In this respect, 
theoretical developments have been coupled with efforts to turn 
commons theory into practice. With technology facilitating a vast 
array of cooperative creative projects, community production has 
increasingly become a solution to cultural production’s free-rider 
problems by converging initiatives, such as open source software, 
Creative Commons, Wiki environments, or SSRN.275 Open access in 
academic publishing follows in the footsteps of these many other 
initiatives.276 Actually, Creative Commons, the open-source software 
movement, and the free software movement created a commons 
through private agreement and technological implementation.277
Again, private firms in the biotechnological and software fields have 
decided to forgo property rights to reduce transaction costs and 
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circumvent any “anti-commons” failure.278 As Reichman noted, 
property rules when applied to small grains of creativity create “legal 
kudzu.”279 Therefore, small grains of innovation are best together in a 
contractually reconstructed commons governed by liability rather 
than property rules.280
Technology has made possible large-scale cooperative behavior
and gift exchange that was previously limited to rarified groups.281
Initially, the large-scale cooperative behavior emerged and evolved 
in software communities282 and academia.283 Benkler describes open 
source software as the “quintessential instance of commons-based 
peer production.”284 However, these cooperative and participative 
behaviors have spread far beyond the initial, rarified communities. 
From open source, we have been moving to open culture.285 Open 
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networks and networked peer collaboration have transformed 
markets by enabling amateurs to innovate.286 David Bollier described 
this process as a “viral spiral” by which Internet users come together 
to build digital tools and share content on self-created online
commons.287 Individual experimentation, sub-cultures, and a 
community of social trust created Linux, Wikipedia, Facebook, 
YouTube, and major political websites.  
III. THE RETURN OF THE GIFT
A. The Return of the Gift from Clan to Crowd Society 
As was discussed at length, gift exchange models always 
played a very relevant role in the history of creativity. Several 
examples emerge from antiquity, such as the negative reaction to the 
Sophists teaching in exchange of a reward, the contraposition 
between Pindar and Simonides, Hermodoros selling Plato’s lectures 
and earning such widespread contempt as to become proverbial, or 
the emphasis on amicitia of the Roman authorial experience. Later, 
Saint Columba’s strenuous defense of open access to knowledge 
exemplified the medieval and Renaissance belief that scientia donum 
dei est, unde vendi non potest. Gift exchange had a relevant role well 
into the Renaissance. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the 
role of the gift was to open up channels of communication and seal 
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the network of interpersonal relations. At the time of the British and 
French “battle of the booksellers,” the rhetoric of the gift still 
resounded powerfully from the nebula of the past in the words of 
Justice Yates or Jean-François Gaultier and shaped the constitutional 
moment of modern copyright law. In this sense, the return of gift 
exchange models has a credible source in the history of creativity. 
Anthropologists and social scientists have long studied 
reciprocity and gift exchange in ancient and modern society.288 The 
anthropological studies of gift exchange have been very influential in 
research into the phenomenon of open source software and hacker 
communities. Anthropologist Steve Mizrach’s early study distilled a 
set of common ethical practices in hacker communities.289 They build 
upon sharing and freedom of information according to the maxim 
that “[i]nformation increases in value by sharing it with other people. 
Data can be the basis for someone else’s learning; software can be 
improved collectively.”290 Hacker ethics’ grundnorm is “[t]he belief 
that information-sharing is a powerful positive good, and that it is an 
ethical duty of hackers to share their expertise by writing free 
software and facilitating access to information and to computing 
resources wherever possible.”291 According to Andrés Guadamuz 
González, “hackers achieve a sense of community in which sharing 
of information becomes essential.”292 In The Cathedral and the 
Bazaar, Eric S. Raymond analyzed “the hacker culture as a ‘gift 
culture’ in which participants compete for prestige by giving time, 
energy, and creativity away.”293 Yochai Benkler extended the same 
conclusions to the open source movement.294
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Today, after long unchallenged dominance of the market and a 
steady trend toward propertization of knowledge-based outputs, gift 
economy is regaining momentum in the networked information 
economy. Gift culture may soon expand to encompass networked 
peer collaboration and user-generated creativity at large. 
Communities of social trust—such as Wikipedia, YouTube, and fan-
fiction communities—have spread virally online through gift 
exchange models. The Internet and digitization have produced a 
great value shift that is reversing what Karl Polanyi termed the 
“Great Transformation”—the nineteenth century rise of the Market 
Society when market activity took a life of its own and overpowered 
the other social institutions.295 In online interaction, there is a 
growing recognition that value can be created by social practices that 
cannot be explained by standard market economic focus on 
quantification. The uncompensated users’ contributions in
developing free software, or updating Wikipedia, Facebook, and 
YouTube are reversing the logics of the market economy. Gift 
economy is emerging as a new practice of value exchange. 
Consumer or user gift systems are taking over traditional market 
systems in many sectors of cultural production and creativity 
exchange.296
In the entertainment industry, new business models switch the 
focus from the content to the container.297 Artists have come to 
realize that free content drives valuable secondary markets, such as
live performances, special editions, bonus material, and 
merchandise.298 Sharing content leads to increased revenue streams 
due to the reputational value that can be extracted from broader 
content distribution. Giving away music records may increase 
concerts’ attendance and help in building the artists’ fan base.299
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Some examples of artists experimenting with gift economy business 
models include Radiohead, Nine Inch Nails, Coldplay, and the Arctic 
Monkeys.300 As The Economist noted, thanks to technological 
advancement, “a lot of things are making money” in the music 
business, notwithstanding the decline in sales of recorded music.301
Starting with a very influential essay from Marcel Mauss, 
societies have been placed on an economic evolutionary scale from 
gift to commodity exchange.302 The so-called clan society was 
dominated by gift exchange, while the modern class society made 
private property and commodity the norm.303 Chris Gregory 
described the process as a continuum from the clan system of 
organization to the proletarian or capitalist system of organization 
and noted that “[a]s one moves from one extreme to the other, 
equality and unity give way to inequality and separation.”304 I suggest 
that the continuum from clan to class society, mentioned by Chris 
Gregory, now extends to the “crowd society,” which features new 
modes of social interaction in digital online communities. As 
discussed in the preceding pages, the crowd society is open and 
decentralized, thus equalitarian, collaborative, and coordinated—thus 
united. In this respect, the crowd society resembles more the 
mechanics of the clan society, rather than the class society. Equality 
and unity are defining characters of digital communities, rather than 
inequality and separation.  
The emergence of the crowd society in the digital environment, 
together with the inherent abundance of digital, knowledge-based 
goods, makes plausible the revival of gift economy models of 
production, rather than a continuation of traditional market economy. 
The networked, mass-collaborative character of creativity in the 
crowd society enhances the proliferativeness of the gift exchange 
model that lies in what anthropologists and social scientists described 
as a debt-economy.305 The goal of a gift economy is never to have 
                                                     
300. See, e.g., Victoria Gu, Neo-Patronage: The New Fan–Artist 
Connection, THE SMOKE SIGNAL (Sept. 15, 2008, 10:09 AM), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20081005031009/http://thesmokesignal.org/news/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=648&Itemid=1.  
301. Having a Ball: In the Supposedly Benighted Music Business, a Lot of 
Things Are Making Money, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 7, 2010), 
http://www.economist.com/node/17199460?story_id=17199460.  
302. See MAUSS, supra note 4, at 91-93; see also MAURICE GODELIER, THE 
ENIGMA OF THE GIFT 205-10 (Nora Scott trans., Univ. Chi. Press 1999) (1996). 
303. See GREGORY, supra note 12, at 17-18. 
304. Id. at 37. 
305. Id. at 19.  
2034 Michigan State Law Review  [Vol:St.Pg] 
debts paid off, but to reinforce a recurring cycle of personal 
indebtedness.306 In contrast to market economy, gift economy, by 
definition, is never a proportionate exchange. Its inner scope is to 
outweigh the previous giver to keep the donors entangled in an 
endless web of reciprocation, and thus achieve accrued reputational 
status. A mere compensation in exchange for the pristine gift would 
do nothing to enhance the social status of the giver. Absent a 
repeatedly unequal exchange, the system would soon reach a 
stalemate, or at least would lose the dynamic and inertial effect of 
continual reciprocations, which are aimed at matching and 
surpassing the largess of the preceding gift giver, thus improving the 
reputational status of the reciprocator. According to Alain Caillé,
under the gift’s paradigm—the third paradigm, in addition to use and 
exchange value—goods and services enjoy a different, additional 
value, which is connected with their capacity to create social 
relationships.307 The gift becomes a tool through which men create
their own society by promoting social relationships.308 Gift 
exchanges can produce value on three distinct levels: individual 
economic value, individual social value, and public social value. The 
donor receives value from the exchange of gifts, for example, the 
code that each software developer may contribute to free or open 
source software projects.309 Each instance of reciprocation leaves the 
giver with reputational value. Additionally, a public social value will 
remain as a surplus of each gift transaction.310 Gift economy could 
lower social tensions, therefore reducing the related social costs and 
producing additional economic surplus. 
The crowd society’s networked peer production merges 
modern and pre-modern creative models together. Decentralization 
places the individual user at the core of the creative process, whereas 
collaboration and resource-sharing emphasize the role of the 
community. The networked information economy multiplies 
individual contributions by merging them into the community. As a 
result, similar to pre-modern creativity, networked peer production is 
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an inclusive creative process, rather than exclusive.311 The return to 
an inclusive paradigm of knowledge production may suggest that 
exclusive rights do not efficiently fit creative processes in 
cyberspace. The networked information economy challenges the 
conventional notion of property, as “[p]roperty in [this economy] is 
configured fundamentally around the right to distribute, not the right 
to exclude.”312 As discussed earlier, there is a dystonic relationship 
between propertization and the networked information economy. In 
the digital environment, we are moving beyond a utilitarian theory of 
creative production.313 The new sharing economy eroded some of the 
justifications for intellectual property by proving that people are 
willing to create without hope of remuneration.314 Rather, 
information exchange—and “playful enjoyment”315—has become the 
ultimate goal in the digital economy.316 The role of non-instrumental 
motivations forms the basis for a “social” model of intellectual 
production.317 The virtue of sharing is regaining its role because 
people return to value the positive externalities that sharing and 
collaborating ethics bring about.318 In addition, cyberspace limits the 
                                                     
311. See Frosio, supra note 261, at 390-95; Giancarlo F. Frosio, A History of 
Aesthetics from Homer to Digital Mash-Ups: Cumulative Creativity and the Demise 
of Copyright Exclusivity, 9 LAW & HUMAN. 262, 263 (2015).  
312. WEBER, supra note 271, at 228; see also John P. Ulhøi, Open Source 
Development: A Hybrid in Innovation and Management Theory, 42 MGMT.
DECISION 1095 (2004). 
313. Cf. CAILLÉ, supra note 239; CAILLÉ, supra note 5.
314. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 3, at 463-64. 
315. See David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the 
Construction of Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 139, 139, 142 (1992); David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 463, 475 (2003); Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant: 
Free Software and the Death of Copyright, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF 
INFORMATION, supra note 206, at 107, 127-29; Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and 
Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151 (2007); Cohen, supra 
note 197.
316. See ALEXANDER BARD & JAN SÖDERQVIST, NETOCRACY: THE NEW 
POWER ELITE AND LIFE AFTER CAPITALISM 126-35, 254-55 (2002). 
317. BENKLER, supra note 263, at 63; see also Paul A. David & Joseph S. 
Shapiro, Community-Based Production of Open-Source Software: What Do We 
Know About the Developers Who Participate?, 20 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 364 (2008) 
(discussing and collecting empirical data regarding the motivations, personal 
attributes, and behavioral patterns of those who are engaged in producing free/libre 
and open source software (FLOSS)); Mark Cenite et al., More Than Just Free 
Content: Motivations of Peer-to-Peer File Sharers, 33 J. COMM. INQUIRY 206
(2009). 
318. See Benkler, Sharing Nicely, supra note 282. For a discussion on 
intellectual property spillovers and externalities, see Frischmann & Lemley, supra
2036 Michigan State Law Review  [Vol:St.Pg] 
negative externalities that may follow from the web of obligations on 
which traditional gift economies are based.319 In the digital 
environment, humans can be enmeshed with a web of obligations 
and gift reciprocations, while still being “aliens and strangers.”320
B. Baudrillard in Cyberspace: Taming Limitless Power with 
Artificial Scarcity 
The re-emergence of a gift economy in the crowd society 
revives Jean Baudrillard’s dream of prodigality and abundance, as 
opposed to our reality of artificial scarcity. Baudrillard urged us to 
“abandon the received idea we have of an affluent society as a 
society in which all material (and cultural) needs are easily met.”321
He continued, “We should rather espouse the notion . . . that it is our 
industrial and productivist societies which, unlike certain primitive 
societies, are dominated by scarcity, by the obsession with scarcity 
characteristic of the market economy.”322 As Baudrillard argued: 
The collective ‘improvidence’ and ‘prodigality’ characteristic of 
primitive societies are the sign[s] of real affluence. We have only the 
signs of affluence. Beneath a gigantic apparatus of production, we 
anxiously eye the signs of poverty and scarcity. But poverty consists, says 
Sahlins, neither in a small quantity of goods, nor simply in a relation 
between ends and means: it is, above all, a relation between human 
beings. The basis for the confidence of primitive peoples and for the fact 
that, within hunger, they live a life of plenty, is ultimately the transparency 
and reciprocity of social relations. It is the fact that no monopolization 
whatever of nature, the soil, the instruments or products of ‘labour’ 
intervenes to obstruct exchange and institute scarcity. There is among 
them no accumulation, which is always the source of power. In the 
economy of the gift and symbolic exchange, a small and always finite 
quantity of goods is sufficient to create general wealth since those goods 
pass constantly from one person to the other. Wealth has its basis not in 
goods, but in the concrete exchange between persons. It is, therefore, 
unlimited since the cycle of exchange is endless, even among a limited 
number of individuals, with each moment of the exchange cycle adding to 
the value of the object exchanged. It is this concrete and relational 
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dialectic which we find inverted, as a dialectic of penury and unlimited 
need, in the process of competition and differentiation characteristic of our 
civilized, industrial societies. Where, in primitive exchange, every 
relationship adds to the social wealth, in our ‘differential’ societies every 
social relationship adds to individual lack, since every thing possessed is 
relativized in relation to others (in primitive exchange, it is valorized by 
the very relationship with others).  
It is not, therefore, paradoxical to argue that in our ‘affluent’ societies 
abundance is lost and that it will not be restored by an interminable 
increase in productivity, by unleashing new productive forces. Since the 
structural definition of abundance and wealth lies in social organization, 
only a revolution of the social organization and of social relations could 
bring those things about.323
In Baudrillard’s opinion, structural scarcity, rather than 
abundance, characterizes our society. Rather than satisfying 
humankind’s material and cultural needs, the consumer society feeds 
a relentless hunger for production.324 In order to keep that hunger in 
place, the consumer society is based on the artificial creation of a 
system of needs.325 This fabricated system of needs serves the 
production system, rather than the opposite. The full emergence of 
this system can be located around the time of the publication of 
Edward Bernays’s Propaganda. In Propaganda, Bernays took 
Sigmund Freud’s ideas and showed American corporations for the 
first time how they could make people want things they didn’t need 
by linking mass-produced goods to their unconscious desires.326
According to Baudrillard, this system of production, then, has the 
function of generating privileges and maintaining them in place 
beyond the ancillary function of producing goods. For Baudrillard, 
therefore, the consumer society is an “organized reign of scarcity,” 
perpetuating a social model where power is based on accumulation 
on one hand and obsession with scarcity of goods and means on the 
other hand.327 In modern times, this “organized reign of scarcity” is 
epitomized by the kilometric lines forming outside Apple Stores in 
every city around the globe before the release of the latest version of 
an iconic electronic gadget. Baudrillard argues that the emancipation 
from this state of collective foolishness may happen only through the 
subversion of the present social structure that the system of needs has 
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the function to keep in place.328 Seeking a revolution of “social 
relations” that can restore the true affluence, Baudrillard wondered: 
Will we return, one day, beyond the market economy, to prodigality? 
Instead of prodigality, we have ‘consumption,’ forced consumption in 
perpetuity, twin sister to scarcity. It was social logic which brought 
primitive peoples the ‘first’ (and only) affluent society. It is our social 
logic which condemns us to luxurious and spectacular penury.329
The crowd society’s economics of commons-based peer 
production perfectly adjusts to Baudrillard’s revolutionary call for 
“prodigality” beyond market economy. Taking Baudrillard’s ideas to 
cyberspace, digital technology inherently brings about affluence 
instead of scarcity.330 Ubiquitous digital networks have instated new 
economics of content reproduction and distribution with marginal 
cost getting close to zero.331 Also, networked peer and mass 
collaboration is first and foremost a revolution of “social relations.”
As McKenzie Wark noted, the core of the social movement around 
free information is “about new kinds of social relations,” because 
[t]hings being free isn’t enough. It is also about making social relations 
that bind people with a weak but widespread obligation to treat what each 
other does as more than just objects, more than just stuff. It’s about 
thinking of oneself as something besides a consumer.332  
The Internet has emerged in our society of scarcity as an eco-
system that has allowed the public to experiment with an alternative 
social model, which is based on equality between peers; exchange 
rather than differentiation; and decentralization rather than power 
concentration. The networked peer collaboration’s “revolution of 
social relations” may dry out the power source of the “organized 
reign of scarcity.” First, the emergence of an alternative symbolic 
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economy challenges the power of capital and accumulation.333
Additionally, the new social model defies the system of fabricated 
needs and the obsession with scarcity by turning consumers into 
users and then creators.334 In the crowd society, there are structural 
preconditions for a return to prodigality beyond the market economy. 
Baudrillard’s categories may serve to explain the conundrum 
that the emergence of networked peer collaboration and user-
generated creativity has brought about. Overbroad commodification 
of information and copyright expansion might be construed as a 
reaction to the digital revolution. In this sense, copyright expansion 
serves to tame the limitless power of networked peer production with 
artificial scarcity in order to maintain in place the structural scarcity 
of the consumer society and prevent the return to “prodigality” 
beyond the market economy. As propertization hinders the potentials 
for growth of open, decentralized, and collaborative digital 
communities, commodification of knowledge-based goods could be 
one way to prevent the emergence of the crowd society as a new 
social paradigm that might undermine, or oust altogether, the present 
rivaling class, capitalist and consumerist social paradigm. 
C. User Patronage 
A possibility for the reinstatement of Baudrillard’s “collective 
prodigality” might have materialized in the crowd society thanks to 
technological advancement. Together with other changes,335 the 
future of creativity may lean toward a consumer gift system336 or user 
patronage, promoting an unrestrained, diffused, and networked 
discourse between creators and the public through digital crowd-
sourcing. The idea of user patronage has been emerging on the 
Internet in the last few years, such as the Street Performer Protocol, 
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written by John Kelsey and Bruce Schneier,337 or the “neo-patronage” 
model offered by Another Sky Press. Another Sky Press defines neo-
patronage as: 
[A]n (r)evolution of patronage enabled by the connectivity between artist 
and audience offered by today’s technologies. At its core, neo-patronage is 
an honor/trust based system of financial support for an artist that comes 
from the artist’s collective audience, rather than a single individual or 
organization. The sum of all patron contributions becomes the means and 
incentive for the artist to continue his or her work. 
. . . .  
In practice, the money the artist receives via neo-patronage serves two 
purposes:  
1. It is payment and ‘thank you’ for work already completed.
2. It is the funding that allows the artist to continue to produce new 
works.338
As Yochai Benkler explained in his recent book The Penguin 
and the Leviathan: How Cooperation Triumphs over Self-Interest,
experiments with pay-as-you-wish pricing in the music industry 
reveal that fans will voluntarily pay far more for their favorite music 
than economic models would ever predict.339 For example, 
Bandcamp—a platform that lets musicians set up simple content 
stores for their works and allows for streams, pay-what-you-want,
and free or conditional downloads—helped artists to make over $1 
million a month. Bandcamp states that when given the option of 
paying-what-you-want for albums with a suggested price, fans pay 
an average of 50% more than the minimum price, and in any other 
instances, fans pay more than the minimum price 50% of the time.340
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Magnatune, whose business model now moved to subscription-only, 
used to permit users to choose the amount they were willing to pay 
for a high-quality album, whereas low-quality albums were given out 
for free.341 The free offers ranged from $5 to $18.342 Quite 
surprisingly, the average payment was $8.20, well above the 
minimum payment and even higher than the recommended price of 
$8.343 The data from each of these enablers suggest that artists have 
increasingly valuable opportunities to go directly to fans, rather than 
surrendering revenue streams to gatekeepers. Consumers are “often 
willing to spend more, if they feel that they’re really getting 
something of value and there is a direct connection to the artist.”344
In this sense, TopSpin Media—a company providing tools to 
content creators to allow them to promote a direct-to-fan marketing 
and retail—is another interesting example. According to TopSpin 
Media, the average transaction price increased from $22 to $26 over 
a year, with a peak price of $88 for offers including a ticket for a live 
event.345 The ubiquitous power of Internet networks has made 
possible a direct connection between artists and the public to support 
the creative process in new ways. In particular, digital crowdfunding 
is an increasingly popular tool to raise money online.346
On Kickstarter and similar platforms, people can pledge for an 
economic goal, which is set up in advance by the project 
developer.347 Kickstarter works by giving artists a way to let fans 
crowdfund the creation of new works. It lets artists offer different 
tiers, through which fans can help fund a project, in the hope of 
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reaching a funding threshold.348 Only after the threshold is met does 
the money change hands.349 As of February 2016, over $2 billion 
have been pledged to artists through Kickstarter.350 There are 283,514 
launched projects with a success rate of 36.18%.351 Kickstarter’s stats 
also report that 100,509 projects were successfully funded and 
approximately $1.91 billion made to successful projects.352
Kickstarter funds all sorts of creative works, and so far, almost $460 
million was pledged to games, almost $325 million was pledged to 
film and video, over $165 million pledged to music, and nearly $90 
million pledged to publishing.353
Of course, Kickstarter is just one of a number of similar 
platforms, such as ArtistShare, SellaBand, IndieGoGo, PledgeMusic, 
AfricaUnsigned, MyMajorCompany, Mobcaster, TubeStart, Pozible, 
Wishberry, CentUp, Crowdfunder, or Ulule.354 These services may 
apply an “all or nothing” or a “keep it all” model. In the latter case, 
the funds collected are handed over to the campaigner, regardless of 
whether the project goal is met or not. Other crowdfunding platforms 
such as Bountysource, Patreon, or Sprked, allow for a continuous 
funding model, rather than one-time donations, for those creators 
making content on a regular basis.355 There are also services allowing 
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users to award creators after the works have been published. Flattr, 
for example, is a microdonation application that displays a link to 
make a donation alongside the content.356
Obviously, today players like Kickstarter are far smaller than 
the old gatekeepers, but they only appeared in the last few years and 
the trend lines are already extraordinarily important.357 Kickstarter 
launched in April 2009.358 At the close of 2011, Kickstarter 
announced that, over the course of the year, about $100 million had 
been pledged to artists through its crowdfunding platform.359
“[A]pproximately $84 million did . . . make it to those content 
creators whose projects were successfully funded.”360 In about three 
years, those figures grew nearly twenty times.361 Most successfully 
funded projects raise less than $10,000, but a growing number have 
reached six and even seven figures.362 About 152 projects raised 
more than $1 million with the largest successfully completed 
Kickstarter project totaling $20,338,986 pledged in March 2015.363
Projecting these figures into the future, we may predict that 
crowdfunding may become a viable option for all sort of creativity, 
including large and expensive productions, such as blockbuster 
movies. 
In the future, user patronage might take several forms. 
Obviously, authors can connect directly with the public through self-
publishing or self-producing in platforms, like Amazon market place 
or Bandcamp, charging a small price or asking for a donation or a 
pay-as-you-wish price. Online self-publishing has been emerging as 
a solid alternative to traditional publishing.364 On a more structured 
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level, authors can collect resources in advance to support a project 
through crowd-sourcing platforms like Kickstarter. In time, authors 
might approach generalist user patronage communities. After raising 
the necessary funds, the authors will provide a digital copy of the 
work to the pledging patrons. A digital copy, possibly including 
advertising, might circulate through open access channels. Authors 
might internalize the advertising revenues or share them with user 
patronage groups. Authors might enjoy the revenue stream coming 
from special or non-digital editions, or licensing or apportionment of 
profits from derivative works.365 Seemingly, the reputational value 
enhanced by wider open access distribution will promote public 
performances or other lucrative appointments. Hypothetically, 
authors might access their user base to fund larger projects. 
Individual authors, artists, or movie directors’ fan-sites might serve 
as online hubs to advertise the project and collect the necessary 
resources. In the case of a movie, for example, user-patrons will 
receive a digital copy that might be circulated online open access or 
viewed from the fan site supporting the project.366 As with 
Kickstarter, user-patrons can pledge for additional or bonus material, 
such as a director’s-cut special edition; merchandise related to the 
movie; a seat at the theatrical premiere; a dinner with the director, 
actors, or crew members to discuss the movie; or a cameo in the 
movie. Again, the movie producers will internalize the revenue 
stream from theatrical releases, advertising, merchandise, or 
licensing or apportionment of profits from derivative works, and so 
on.
Cooperative creativity and the interaction of groups of users 
and creators on a voluntary but structural basis is becoming a new 
model for creativity. Wikipedia, the fifth most visited website and 
the first online encyclopedia, exemplifies the power of ubiquitous 
digital user patronage. Wikipedia is being completely crowdsourced 
both as to intellectual and economic contributions, increasing its 
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annual fundraising from $8 million in 2009 to $75 million in 2015.367
Digital crowdfunding shows that there are new business models 
circumventing traditional gatekeepers by building upon the 
increasing willingness of users to support artists and creativity 
directly. New businesses, which act as enablers rather than 
gatekeepers, might promote democratization by providing the 
authors with enhanced artistic freedom. The emergence of 
mechanisms to support and stimulate creativity based on user 
patronage will work towards the goal of empowering the public as 
the central figure of the creative process. User patronage might 
reconnect creativity with its cumulative and public nature. It shall 
restore centrality to the rhetoric of the gift in the discourse about 
creativity and to Gaultier’s idea of a social contract between authors 
and public.368 Volker Grassmuck noted: 
[A] new Social Contract between creatives and audiences has to be 
negotiated, a new arrangement for the reciprocal “creative contributions” 
by authors and by society. 
The current debate on culture is focused on property rights and their 
enforcement. The Social Contract is intended to refocus the debate on the 
issues behind the existing legal rules. The shift from the analogue to the 
digital knowledge order calls into question the boundaries between private 
and public, professional and non-professional, commercial and non-
commercial. 
. . . . 
The Social Contract encompasses the whole range of transactions: in 
markets, through public funding for arts and culture (collective 
redistribution through taxation and broadcast fees and the provision of a 
public knowledge infrastructure for science and education, libraries, 
museums, archives etc.), through voluntary action (free-licensing and 
donations (Wikipedia), street performer protocol-style pre-payments and 
pledges) and through legal regulations (limitations and exceptions in 
copyright law, including the proposals for a Culture Flat-Rate and the 
public domain).369
                                                     
367. See Fundraising Reports, WIKIMEDIA FOUND.,
https://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Fundraising_reports (last updated Oct. 2, 
2015, 5:26 PM). 
368. See supra Part I.G.  
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TRADE IN CREATIVE EXPRESSIONS 1-2 (2009), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ 
fcrw/sites/fcrw/images/Grassmuck_09-10-23_Free-Culture_Berkman_txt.pdf. 
(paper presented at the Research Workshop on Free Culture, Berkman Center for 
Internet & Society, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts). 
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According to Baudrillard’s categories, the social contract that a 
user patronage model implies would subvert the present social 
structure that the system of needs has the function to keep in place 
through a “revolution of social relations” between creators and users. 
Digital crowdfunding would help to blur the distinction between 
users and creators even further, thus making the role of gatekeepers, 
intermediaries, and distributors less and less relevant. Even if this is 
not yet the return to prodigality that Baudrillard sought, it may be a 
step toward the demise of push marketing strategies in favor of the 
advent of pull marketing.370 User patronage may set the advent of a 
web 3.0 and the transition from a corporate-driven culture to a user-
driven culture. Users’ centrality—or the centrality of human 
relationships—and the demise of push marketing would dispossess 
gatekeepers of the capacity of maintaining an “organized reign of 
scarcity” through a system of artificial needs.371 Transparent and 
reciprocal “relation[s] between human beings”372 within a networked 
information economy based on commons-based peer production and 
user patronage would make concentration of power through 
monopolization of resources and accumulation harder. Perhaps, the
widespread emergence of user patronage may be a step toward a 
transition from a consumer society to a networked user community 
or crowd society. 
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